Agency Problems and Cash Savings from Equity Issuance by Anthony, Andrea
AGENCY PROBLEMS AND CASH SAVINGS FROM EQUITY ISSUANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
ANDREA THERESE ANTHONY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION  
 
Presented to the Department of Finance  
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
June 2014 
ii 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Andrea Therese Anthony 
 
Title: Agency Problems and Cash Savings from Equity Issuance 
 
This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Finance by: 
 
Stephen McKeon Chair 
Larry Dann Core Member 
Diane Del Guercio Core Member 
Trudy Cameron Institutional Representative 
 
and 
 
Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation;  
 Dean of the Graduate School 
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School 
 
Degree awarded June 2014 
iii 
© 2014 Andrea Therese Anthony
iv
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Andrea Therese Anthony 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Finance 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Agency Problems and Cash Savings from Equity Issuance 
 
 
I examine the effect of ownership structure on firms’ propensities to save the 
proceeds of a share issuance as cash. Specifically, I focus on changes in cash savings at 
the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO), a moment at which the firm experiences a 
large inflow of cash, to determine whether ownership structures such as managerial 
blockholdings or the presence of institutional investors materially affect firms’ decisions 
regarding their level of cash savings. I find that firms with managerial blockholders are 
more inclined to save share issuance proceeds as cash, relative to firms with outside 
blockholders or no blockholders present. This finding could be interpreted as consistent 
with either managerial entrenchment or incentive alignment, so I distinguish between 
these competing forces by examining SEO announcement returns. The market’s reaction 
to SEO announcements when managerial blockholders are present is significantly worse 
on average when the firm has excess cash, lending support to the entrenchment 
explanation. I also find that firms with greater total institutional ownership save more 
cash from equity issuance, which is consistent with the theory that greater firm 
monitoring allows optimal corporate cash holdings to increase because shareholders are 
less concerned about potential misuses of cash.   
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) argue that managers inherently 
wish to accumulate cash in excess of the level that maximizes firm value because they are 
risk averse or want flexibility to pursue personal objectives. Given this agency problem, 
the presence of external monitors of a firm could reduce agency costs and affect 
managers’ flexibility and decisions related to corporate cash holdings. However, given 
this same agency problem, the presence of more insider blockholders could increase 
managerial entrenchment and add to this agency problem. 
The holding of cash offers both benefits (e.g., financial flexibility) and costs to 
firms, as outlined in Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen predicts that 
shareholders will choose to limit managers’ access to free cash flow to mitigate agency 
conflicts over its deployment. The concern for shareholders is that it is very easy for 
managers to misuse cash holdings; at the same time, it is difficult for shareholders to 
assess the valid use of these cash holdings. Jensen contends that the optimal amount of 
cash holdings is driven by the tradeoff between having enough cash to finance profitable 
projects, but not so much cash that managers can easily waste it on unprofitable projects 
that benefit the manager at the expense of shareholders. Thus, the presence of external 
monitors could help mitigate these costs and increase shareholder confidence that the use 
of these funds will be enhance value, which would allow firms’ optimal cash holdings 
levels to increase and lead to firms holding more cash.  
In this paper, I study how agency problems affect firms’ cash decisions. 
Specifically, I examine cash savings at the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO), 
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which is a moment when firms experience large influxes in cash, to determine whether 
concentrated ownership of shares can provide monitoring benefits or add entrenchment 
costs. The free cash flow problem in firms that collect large windfalls of cash from asset 
sales (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995) is similar to the potential free cash flow problem 
that firms experience following an equity issuance. Given that equity issues produce 
resources that are allocated at the manager's discretion, agency problems could develop at 
firms in which agency problems were latent prior to the SEO.  
Public equity issues are some of the largest infusions of capital in a firms’ 
lifecycle. Such issues can drastically increase cash reserves that could be potentially 
mismanaged. This factor makes equity issuance an especially interesting setting in which 
to study the relation between agency problems and cash holdings. Most prior studies, in 
the literature, concerning agency problems and cash, focus on the levels of firms’ cash 
holdings. However, McLean (2011) demonstrates that equity issuance can induce large 
shifts in the level of cash holdings. Thus, understanding how ownership structure affects 
firms’ propensities to save the proceeds from share issuance as cash can help us better 
understand corporate cash holdings. McLean reports that, since 1985, the average firm 
saved more cash from share issuance than from cash flow, which suggests that share 
issuance has been the primary source of increases in cash holdings for U.S. firms over the 
last two decades. He also finds that the savings rate of debt is virtually zero; therefore, 
debt proceeds are not used for cash savings. Thus, focusing on share issuance may be 
appropriate if we wish to understand how agency costs affect corporate cash holdings. 
Blockholders, meaning those shareholders with at least 5% of the total shares 
outstanding in a firm, have more incentive to monitor than smaller shareholders, and thus 
3 
might influence the firm more reliably. To analyze the effect of agency problems on 
firms’ propensities to save share issuance proceeds as cash, I first consider whether the 
presence of different types of blockholders correlates empirically with a firm’s propensity 
to save share issuance proceeds as cash. I also examine whether insider and outsider 
blockholders are associated with different influences. Greater managerial entrenchment 
allows managers to more easily take actions that are self-serving. Thus, I hypothesize that 
greater insider block ownership, a proxy for managerial entrenchment, is associated with 
a greater propensity to save share issuance cash proceeds. However, an alternative 
hypothesis, resulting in the same greater propensity to save share issuance proceeds as 
cash, is that a greater block ownership by managers leads to a stronger alignment 
between the manager’s goals and shareholder value.  
To distinguish whether the presence of an insider blockholding is more strongly 
indicative of managerial entrenchment or incentive alignment, I estimate a target level of 
cash for each firm year and the valuation effect of SEO announcements. Based on 
evidence I report in more detail later, I interpret insider block ownership as more strongly 
indicative of managerial entrenchment, and thus utilize this explanation in the results that 
follow. 
I next consider the effect of institutional investors as monitors. Harford, Kecskes, 
and Mansi (2012) reason that firms with greater external monitoring have lower agency 
costs of holding cash.  Therefore, as external monitoring increases, the optimal amount of 
corporate cash holdings also increases, which allows firms with higher levels of external 
monitoring to save greater percentages of equity issuance proceeds as cash, assuming 
these firms were below their optimal cash level before the SEO. Absent this source of 
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monitoring, it would be value destroying for firms to keep the same amount of proceeds 
from the SEO unless other equally effective governance structures are in place to restrain 
them. Thus, increased monitoring allows managers to hold more cash because 
shareholders know that these managers are being watched. This hypothesis contrasts with 
Jensen’s scenario wherein firm monitoring forces self-interested managers to pay out 
cash, which results in lower cash holdings. The testable prediction is that institutional 
ownership, a proxy for the level of external monitoring, will be positively related to the 
amount of cash savings from share issuance proceeds, because the optimal cash holdings 
are higher for those firms with higher levels of monitoring. However, this prediction is 
dependent on the distance from the target level of cash before issuing new shares. 
It may seem counterintuitive that I expect higher propensities to save cash from 
share issuance both in the presence of external monitors and internal blockholders. 
However, the external monitor hypothesis results from the higher optimal level of cash 
holdings of the firm, thus allowing the firm to save more of the issuance proceeds as 
cash. In contrast, the insider blockholder hypothesis posits an increase in the non-value 
enhancing uses of cash proceeds, such as precautionary savings.  
I find that the presence of insider blockholders in a firm, a proxy for managerial 
entrenchment, has a statistically significant positive effect on cash savings of share 
issuance proceeds whereas the presence of outsider blockholders does not yield a 
significant effect. Distinguishing between the different types of insider blockholders, 
specifically director non-officer and officer blockholders, I observe that firms with at 
least one officer blockholder are more inclined to save share issuance proceeds as cash. 
However, this effect of greater cash savings does not arise with the other types of 
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blockholders. These findings suggest that managerial entrenchment is positively 
correlated to firms’ propensities to save share issuance proceeds as cash. These results 
support the more traditional view that managers are inherently reluctant to disburse 
excess cash, which results in greater propensities to save share issuance proceeds as cash 
at firms in which managers’ self-interested behaviors are the least limited (Opler et al., 
1999). Thus, when these managers hold blocks of shares, we see that firms’ propensities 
to save share issuance proceeds as cash increase, at least relative to firms without insider 
blockholders.  
I also find that firms with greater ownership by institutional investors are more 
likely to save cash from equity issuance. To the extent that firms hold less than their 
optimal levels of cash prior to issuance, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms with greater external monitoring have lower agency costs associated with holding 
cash. As a result, the optimal level of corporate cash holdings for these firms will be 
higher and they are able to save more of their issuance proceeds as cash compared to 
other firms with less monitoring.  
Harford et al. (2012) do not examine the effects of these monitors on changes in 
cash holdings as a result of share issuance; rather, they consider the effect of these 
monitors simply on the total level of corporate cash holdings. My results add to this 
literature by looking specifically at changes in corporate cash holdings. If firms are 
holding less cash than their optimal level before the SEO, the inflow of cash from an 
SEO could be used to rebalance the firm’s portfolio closer to their target level of cash 
holdings. I estimate a target cash level for each firm, where excess cash is defined as the 
difference between actual cash and target cash. In results detailed later, I find evidence 
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that firms with institutional investor holdings between 5% and 20% have negative excess 
cash on average before the SEO and shift to positive levels following the SEO. The 
model for determining target cash does not take into account agency costs or mechanisms 
in place to mitigate them. So, empirically, a firm having excess cash can be reinterpreted 
as having a higher optimal level of cash. In support of this argument, I find that firms 
with greater than 20% institutional ownership have excess cash, both in the years before 
the SEO and in the years following the SEO.  
To understand whether these propensities to save cash are the result of a change in 
optimal cash holdings or a non-optimal misuse of cash, it is essential to test whether 
increases in cash savings are value-enhancing or value-destroying. I propose that insider 
blockholders are more likely to be entrenched and the increased cash savings are value-
decreasing, whereas institutional holdings have greater incentives to monitor and the 
increased cash savings are value-enhancing. As mentioned above, I find that the average 
abnormal return for a firm with excess cash is significantly more negative than for firms 
with no excess cash the year before the SEO when an officer blockholder is present. I do 
not find a significant difference between firms with and without excess cash before the 
SEO when an outside blockholder is present. If shareholders are concerned about the 
potential misuse of SEO funds, then the presence of strong monitors should partially 
mitigate the negative returns usually associated with an SEO announcement. Consistent 
with this idea, I find that greater institutional ownership is positively related to abnormal 
stock returns in the SEO announcement period, and even more so after controlling for 
excess cash both before and after the SEO. 
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In light of the evidence that equity issuance has been the primary source of 
increases in cash levels for U.S. firms over the last two decades, changes in cash 
surrounding an SEO are one of the main contributors to the subsequent level of corporate 
cash holdings. Therefore, changes in cash, rather than solely cash levels, are an intuitive 
avenue to explore when considering the effects of agency problems on cash. In this way, 
my findings broaden our understanding of the forces that drive McLean’s (2011) and 
Kim and Weisbach’s (2008) results that firms save a substantial fraction of the cash 
raised in SEOs.  
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II includes a review of the related 
literature and presents the hypotheses tested. Chapter III presents the data used and the 
sampling procedure. Chapter IV summarizes the main findings. Chapter V concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Jensen (1986) predicts that shareholders will choose to limit manager access to 
free cash flow to mitigate agency conflicts over its deployment. This conflict is especially 
pertinent in the use of corporate cash holdings. The concern for shareholders is that it is 
both very easy for managers to misuse cash holdings and, at the same time, very difficult 
for shareholders to assess the valid use of cash holdings.  
The evidence varies on whether shareholders should be worried about cash 
stockpiles. Opler et al. (1999) form a measure of excess cash by calculating the difference 
between the actual cash level of the firm and a predicted level of cash by a static tradeoff 
model where managers maximize shareholder wealth. They find that the propensity to 
use excess cash on investments and acquisitions is very small. They show that, when 
given the opportunity, management will accumulate excess cash.  This finding implies 
that managers hold cash based on precautionary motives. In support of this finding, 
Harford (1999) provides evidence that shareholders should worry about how managers 
spend large amounts of cash. He reports that firms with large cash reserves are more 
likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions.  
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) provide evidence that shareholders assign a 
lower value to an additional dollar of cash reserves when greater agency problems are 
likely within a firm. Finally, Gao, Harford, and Li (2013) study both private and public 
firms and show that agency problems increase the level of cash held by the firm as a 
consequence of managers who prefer more freedom from external monitoring and choose 
to hold more internal slack. 
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In contrast, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) show that the operating performance of 
high-cash firms is comparable to, or better than, the performance of lower-cash firms 
matched by size and industry over a five-year period. This finding suggests that higher 
cash reserves do not lead to value destruction caused by agency problems. Mikkelson and 
Partch also find that high cash holdings are associated with greater investment and 
greater growth in assets. More recently, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) examine 
how agency problems relate to the propensity to stockpile cash. They show that better 
internal governance is correlated with higher cash holdings and a better use of excess 
cash holdings. They also find that firms with weaker shareholder rights and lower insider 
ownership have lower cash reserves than do firms with stronger shareholder rights and 
higher insider ownership. However, they do not find evidence that supports a significant 
correlation between manager pay sensitivity or institutional ownership and the level of 
cash holdings.  
Harford et al. (2012) consider external governance mechanisms and contend that 
better external firm monitoring allows firms to hold more cash. These authors reason that 
investors with longer investment horizons monitor firms more intensively because their 
net benefit of monitoring is higher. As a result, the optimal amount of corporate cash 
holdings increases. Empirically, they find that firms with institutional holdings and 
longer investor horizons, measured by portfolio turnover, do hold more cash.  
On the other hand, Brown, Chen, and Shekhar (2012) consider short and long-
term institutional investors, and find that the positive relation between institutional 
ownership and firm cash holdings is driven mainly by short-term institutional investors. 
They also argue that short-term trading creates short-term price pressure for the stock, 
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which results in volatile stock prices. Herding behaviors of some active trading 
institutions intensify this effect. This stock volatility causes more costly external 
financing because of the higher direct costs and greater uncertainty in equity issuance. 
Thus, a greater precautionary stockpiling of cash results from external financial 
constraints. They reason that we should expect a positive association between short-term 
institutional holdings in a firm and the firm’s cash holdings.  
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) study the level of cash holdings in a firm, but do 
not look at cash savings that stem specifically from equity issuance. They consider four 
motives for firms to hold cash including a transaction motive, a precautionary motive, a 
tax motive, and an agency motive. They rule out an agency motive as the reason why 
these cash balances increased using the G-Index, the value of cash holdings, and firms’ 
excess cash to proxy for agency problems. The G-Index is the governance index 
developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) which uses the occurrence of 24 unique 
governance rules. They interpret the evidence as most consistent with a precautionary 
motive. Although Bates et al. do not look at cash savings that stem specifically from 
equity issuance, Kim and Weisbach (2008) consider cash savings from equity issuance 
and report that firms save a substantial fraction of the cash raised in SEOs. They estimate 
that each dollar of capital raised in an SEO is associated with a $0.58 higher cash balance 
the year after the SEO, and this greater level of cash savings is maintained even four 
years after the SEO. 
Equity issuance is a juncture at which firms can considerably increase their cash 
reserves. This feature makes the event of equity issuance an interesting opportunity to 
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study the relation between agency problems and cash holdings.1 Numerous studies 
document that SEO announcements generate negative stock price reactions. Kim and 
Purnanandam (2011) report evidence to suggest that weak governance is a primary driver 
for investors’ negative reactions to equity issuance. They use the presence of business 
combination (BC) statutes, which create a legal environment that is less susceptible to 
governance mechanisms (e.g., takeovers) to estimate a firm’s strength of governance. 
Kim and Purnanandam use a difference-in-differences approach to show that the stock 
price reaction to SEO announcements by firms in states with BC statutes in effect, a 
proxy for those with weaker governance, is significantly more negative than is the case 
for SEOs by firms in their control group. They maintain that investors become worried 
about the non-productive use of SEO proceeds when governance is poorer.  
Saving SEO proceeds as cash could be considered a non-productive use of these 
proceeds. However, Kim and Purnanandam hypothesize that, even if a firm has low 
growth opportunities, if it has strong governance, investors will feel more confident that 
the proceeds will be used productively. Consistent with this hypothesis, Kim and 
Purnanandam show that investors’ reactions to pure primary SEOs are non-negative if 
                                                                
1 By issuing equity, the threat of agency conflict might change. Once new equity is issued, the fraction of 
votes controlled by management is reduced unless they increase their investment in the firm. As a result, 
equity issuance makes external intervention (e.g., hostile takeover) less difficult. However, just as the 
voting power of management decreases after an equity issuance, voting power also decreases for 
blockholders, institutional investors, and other monitors, which complicates this aspect of the agency 
conflict with new equity issuance.  Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) point out that, if a firm does not have 
valuable investment opportunities, equity issuance causes agency costs of managerial discretion to increase. 
This event provides greater incentives for outsiders to attempt to influence the actions of management.  As 
a result, control activities, such as monitoring by board members, active monitoring by shareholders, 
takeovers, and proxy fights, become more beneficial to shareholders and outside investors after an equity 
issuance. They also find that firms without valuable investment opportunities have more negative stock 
price reactions to equity issues than do firms with better investment opportunities. Jung et al. reason that, if 
management is not constrained by monitoring, an unexpected equity issuance will result in a negative effect 
on shareholder wealth because it is likely not in the interest of shareholders as the issuance funds are likely 
to be invested poorly.   
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issued by firms with stronger alignment of managerial incentives to shareholder value. 
Pure primary SEOs do not include secondary offerings in which blockholders and 
managers sell their own shares, a behavior that typically transmits a negative signal. 
Thus, if alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value is strong (i.e., 
stronger governance), then pure primary SEOs should not cause investors any undue 
concern over the announcement of an equity issuance. Kim and Purnanandam do not 
consider whether the amount of cash saved is correlated with the negative stock price 
reactions they observe.  
Institutional investor demand can also mitigate negative stock price reactions to 
seasoned equity issuance announcements. Alti and Sulaeman (2012) show that stock 
prices for issuing firms with low demand by institutional investors during the offer period 
continue to decline until the SEO offer date. However, stock prices completely recover 
from initial negative reactions, provided that the issuing firms have high demand by 
institutional investors. Thus, on average, these issuing firms are able to complete their 
offers at their pre-announcement stock price levels.  Alti and Sulaeman interpret this 
result as indicating a positive effect of institutional demand on market reaction. 
Aggregate demand by institutional investors conveys information to the market because 
institutions are commonly considered to be sophisticated and better-informed investors. 
Strong institutional demand for a firm's stock discloses that a number of institutions have 
recently analyzed that firm and have chosen, subsequently, to buy its stock. The authors 
hypothesize that these decisions by institutions to buy the stock help alleviate market 
concerns about adverse selection and act as a certification concerning the market 
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valuation of the firm. Thus, the market is more amenable to an equity issue at the 
prevailing stock price. 
McLean (2011) documents that firms’ propensities to hold share issuance 
proceeds as cash, on average, increased significantly over a sample period between 1971 
and 2008. During the 1970s, he reports that $1.00 of issuance resulted in $0.23 of cash 
savings, whereas during the most recent decade, $1.00 of issuance resulted in $0.60 of 
cash savings. His results suggest that cash savings are now the primary use of share 
issuance proceeds for U.S. firms. He interprets this evidence as support for the hypothesis 
that an increase in cash savings from the proceeds of share issuance is driven by an 
increase in the precautionary motive. He reasons that firms with valuable investment 
opportunities and volatile cash flow should accumulate precautionary cash balances to 
avoid having to forgo future profitable investment opportunities.  
McLean also reasons that firms might choose to issue equity in good times 
because liquidity varies over time, and market conditions could later make equity 
issuance too costly. He employs R&D expenditure, industry cash flow volatility, 
dividends, and an index of all three to proxy for precautionary motives. McLean contends 
that firms with greater R&D spending tend to have more valuable investment 
opportunities and are more likely to experience financial distress. Thus, these firms have 
greater precautionary motives and hold more cash. I consider an alternative explanation 
wherein R&D depends on past cash flow due to market imperfections, which is perhaps 
why McLean (2011) finds a correlation, rather than as a result of a precautionary motive.  
McLean (2011) considers only precautionary motives and market timing as 
possible drivers of the increase in share issuance cash savings. In this paper, I consider 
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whether agency costs contribute to firms’ propensities to save the proceeds of share 
issuance as cash. I specifically consider two hypotheses related to monitoring and 
managerial entrenchment. I also investigate whether the monitoring and entrenchment 
hypotheses could explain McLean’s findings with respect to his proxies for precautionary 
motives. McLean studies all issues grouped together, whereas I differentiate the effects of 
SEOs. I contend that the strength of monitoring affects share issuance cash savings from 
an SEO differently than other issues; McLean’s tests do not differentiate among various 
forms of issuance. 
I specifically investigate the effect of the presence of different types of 
blockholders, including all, officer, director non-officer, and outside blockholders, on 
cash changes following an SEO. Managers, many of whom are included as officer 
blockholders, might have economic interests other than simply that as shareholders. For 
example, officer blockholders might value their consumption of perquisites at the 
expense of other stakeholders, particularly shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that ownership by managers can help align incentives and reduce agency costs. 
However, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) show empirically that, while small levels 
of managerial ownership can reduce agency costs, high levels of managerial ownership 
can serve to entrench management and reduce firm value.  
Competing arguments exist for the effect of outside blockholders as well. 
Although these blockholders are less likely to be subject to entrenchment concerns, 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) demonstrate that blockholders are not a homogeneous 
group. Some blockholders appear to influence corporate behavior, while others seem to 
prefer a passive role. Perhaps some blockholders, such as hedge funds, have few 
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restrictions and can pursue whatever policy their clients accept, while others might 
encounter significant institutional constraints. Some blockholders could also encounter 
numerous regulatory barriers and potential conflicts of interest that make active 
monitoring a challenge (Gerken, 2009). Thus, I expect inside blockholders will have 
different incentives and therefore, possibly, different influences on agency costs 
compared to outside blockholders. 
Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) study the same classifications of blockholders and 
use the same data provided by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006). 
They measure the effectiveness of blockholders in mitigating agency costs such as 
managerial extravagance, poor asset management, and underinvestment, and find that 
outside and inside blockholders exert their influence differently. They report that outside 
blockholders are more effective in mitigating managerial extravagance while inside 
blockholders, especially managerial blockholders, are more effective at improving the 
efficiency of firm asset utilization. Further, they report that all types of block ownership 
are significantly negatively related to managerial extravagance, except for officer 
blockholders. These officer blockholders are the only blockholders who do not 
significantly deter managerial extravagance. In addition, Dlugosz et al. report that only 
director non-officer blockholders significantly overcome underinvestment problems.  
I also investigate the effects of the amount of institutional ownership on the level 
of cash savings from an equity issuance. Institutional monitoring could alleviate the 
potential mismanagement of cash after an SEO. Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos 
(2011) study portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries from 
2003–2008. They find evidence consistent with institutional ownership affecting 
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governance; however, they do not find evidence suggesting that governance affects 
institutional ownership. Specifically, firm-level governance improves after an increase in 
ownership by foreign institutions. These authors also show that firms with higher 
institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs). They further report that firms with greater institutional ownership 
exhibit an increase in value over time. Their results suggest that institutional investors do 
in fact monitor, and their investments strengthen the corporate governance of firms. 
Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) show that, in the context of mergers, the presence of 
independent long-term institutional investors makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. 
Demiralp, D’Mello, Schlingemann, and Subramaniam (2011) find that announcement 
returns of SEOs are positively correlated with institutional ownership levels and 
concentration, which suggests that the market believes there are monitoring benefits to 
such ownership. Post-issue stock returns are also positively correlated with 
contemporaneous post-issue changes in institutional ownership and the concentration of 
their shareholdings. Dlugosz et al. also find a positive relationship between post-issue 
operating performance and institutional ownership measures after controlling for the 
informational advantage of institutional investors. These findings, along with those of 
Chen et al., suggest that institutional monitoring can influence real firm performance. 
 
  
17 
CHAPTER III 
DATA 
Sample Construction 
My measurement of blockholders is based on data provided by Dlugosz et al. 
(2006). Companies disclose their blockholders, defined as those with 5% or greater 
percentage of shares, in their proxy statements. Most prior studies use the Compact 
Disclosure database to identify large shareholders and their shareholdings because of the 
difficulty in collecting data independently directly from proxy statements. However, 
Dlugosz et al. report that the Compact Disclosure database fails to record footnotes for 
some corporate annual proxy statements.  
The lack of footnotes in the Compact Disclosure database could lead to double 
counting of the same ownership or mislabeling preferred shares as common 
stockholdings. They reason that the measurement error in this database could be 
responsible for biased empirical results in prior studies of the effects of blockholders. As 
a result, Dlugosz et al. (2006) compare the Compact Disclosure database with original 
proxy statements and produce a more accurate data set for blockholders who own at least 
5% of the firm’s equity in a given year. These data are available from Andrew Metrick’s 
website for the period 1996 to 2001 and cover the Standard and Poor’s 500 and annual 
lists of the largest corporations in Fortune, Forbes, and BusinessWeek. Overall, the 
sample covers 7,649 firm-years, 1,913 unique firms, and about 90% of the value of the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ markets. 
Based on analysis by Dlugosz et al. (2006), I classify blockholders into two types: 
inside and outside. Inside blockholders include officer, director non-officer, affiliated, 
18 
and those related to Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Outside blockholders are 
those not defined in the above categories. Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) use the same 
approach to classification (insiders versus outsiders). Outsiders and insiders might have 
different incentives when it comes to cash holdings. Insiders might wish to accumulate 
cash for precautionary motives as well as perquisites, whereas outsiders might wish for 
firms to save as little cash as possible above the firms’ optimal level, to reduce potential 
agency costs. Thus, the categorization outlined here will allow me to test these different 
incentives empirically.  
My measurement of institutional ownership is based on data obtained from 
Thomson Financial CDA Spectrum database. The 1978 amendment to the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 states that all institutional investors with holdings of $100 million 
or more under management are required to report their holdings quarterly using Form 
13F of the Securities and Exchange Commission; common stock positions greater than 
10,000 shares or $200,000 must be filed. Thomson Financial reports the quarterly 
holdings information for each institutional investor of each firm, beginning in the first 
quarter of 1980. Examples of such institutions include bank trusts, insurance companies, 
investment companies (mutual funds), independent investment advisors, employee stock 
ownership plans, foundations, university endowments, and pension funds (public and 
private).  
Institutional ownership is defined as the fraction of a firm’s shares held by 
institutional investors. To calculate this measure, I sum the shares held by all institutional 
investors for each firm in each quarter and then divide the sum by the number of total 
shares outstanding for each firm. Institutional ownership data has calendar-quarter 
19 
frequency; however, the financial information that is merged later has fiscal-year 
frequency. Thus, when merging these data sets, I match annual firm financial information 
with the percentage of institutional ownership recorded for the quarter immediately 
before the fiscal year-end. If a firm in my sample has no institutional ownership, I set its 
institutional ownership proportion to zero.  
I start my sample construction with all U.S. firms included in the Compustat 
database. These data are merged with the institutional holdings data and Dlugosz et al.’s 
(2006) sample. Excluded from the data are firms with missing values for cash and 
marketable securities, book value of assets, book value of liabilities, or operating income. 
Firms with standard industrial classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999 
(financial companies) and those between 4900 and 4999 (utilities) are also excluded from 
the sample, which follows McLean (2011) and Bates et al. (2009).  
Following McLean (2011), the source-of-cash variables include Issue, Debt, Cash 
Flow, and Other (see Appendix A). I measure equity issuance using SEO issuance data 
from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC) database, which provides 
comprehensive information on U.S. domestic public offerings for all equity issues 
beginning in 1971. Thus the Issue variable is limited to only those proceeds from pure 
primary SEOs. The use of this issuance variable from the SDC contrasts with many 
previous papers that use annual total proceeds from the sale of stock, found in Compustat, 
to measure proceeds from issuance. The Compustat variable, sstk, is pulled from the 
statement of cash flows and includes all share issues that result in cash flow to the firm.  
These issues include not only SEOs but also proceeds from private placements; rights 
offerings; stock sales through direct purchase plans; preferred stock issues; conversions 
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of debt and preferred stocks; and employee option exercise and benefit plans. Share 
issues that are excluded from this Compustat measure are those that do not result in cash 
flow to the firm, such as stock-financed mergers and restricted share grants.  
McKeon (2014) demonstrates that most observations of cash inflows from the 
sale of stock are not financing events triggered by the firm; rather, they are initiated by 
employees, primarily through exercise of stock options. His analysis suggests that, during 
the most recent decade, employee-initiated equity issues exceed inflows from SEOs, 
initial public offerings, and private placements combined. Therefore, I argue that my 
measure of issuance, using only those proceeds from seasoned equity issuance, is more 
appropriate in this setting than a consolidated measure from Compustat. This is because I 
am interested in how different governance mechanisms influence managers’ decisions. 
Thus, I limit my proceeds measure to only those firms for which management controls 
the timing of the issuance.   
My measure of change in cash, ΔCash, is the difference between cash at the end 
of the year and cash at the beginning of the year, scaled by the book value of assets 
measured at the beginning of the year. All ratio variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles, with the exception of Issue where observations with Issue greater than 
ten are dropped. This restriction results in five observations dropped from the 
blockholder sample and 358 observations dropped from the institutional holdings sample. 
This process results in a final sample of approximately 6,000 firm-year observations over 
the period 1996 to 2001 for the blockholder sample and 128,000 firm-year observations 
over the period 1980 to 2008 for the institutional holdings sample. 
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Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and 
number of observations of each variable of interest in the blockholder sample. I report 
results for two samples, as shown in Panel A and Panel B of Table 1. Panel A 
corresponds to the case where issuance is measured only from proceeds of SEOs using 
the SDC database. Panel A is the sample used in the rest of this paper. Panel B is the 
sample when all issues, not just SEOs, are used. Panel B is for comparison purposes only 
and is not used in the rest of the paper.  
The mean value for ΔCash is approximately .019, which reveals that firms 
increase their cash holdings, on average, each year. Table 1 confirms McLean’s (2011) 
finding that, on average, external financing provides firms with more funds than does 
internally generated cash flow. While the mean for Issue (0.006) appears very small, it is 
dominated by observations of zero in the sample because most firm-years do not contain 
an SEO. Only approximately 3% of observations in the sample have positive issuance 
that year; therefore, it is best to consider Panel C of Table 1b, which shows that, when 
looking at only the positive observations, the mean of Issue is .209.  
Table 1b also reports the number of positive, zero, and negative values for other 
variables in the blockholder sample. Table 1b Panel A shows that approximately 88% of 
all firm-years, or 5,435 firm-years of the 6,183 total firm-years, have at least one 
blockholder, and approximately 79% of all firm-years, or 4,860 firm-years of the 6,183 
total firm-years, have an outside blockholder. Although it is common for a firm to have at 
least one outside blockholder in a year, it is relatively uncommon for a firm to have 
inside blockholders. In this sample, only 16% of firm-years have at least one officer 
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blockholder, and only 9% have at least one director non-officer blockholder. When 
comparing the SEO Issuance Only Sample to the All Issuance Sample, it is interesting to 
note that I have only 176 firm-years with a positive value for issuance in the SEO Only 
Sample whereas I have 4911 firm-years with a positive value for issuance when 
measured by all issues. This highlights how different my results on equity issuance might 
be when limiting my sample to only those issues from an SEO rather than using all issues 
combined. 
Panel B of Table 1b reports the number of observations for the different possible 
combinations of blockholders present. The sample is strongly dominated by the presence 
of outsiders compared to insiders. I observe that outside blockholders are far more 
common than are other types of blockholders at the time of issuance.  I report that the 
sample consists of 55 firm-year observations where there is an insider blockholder 
present and 133 where there is an outsider blockholder present during the year of an SEO. 
It is important to note that there can be both insider and outsider blocks present in the 
firm at once, thus twelve of these firm-years overlap.  
Panel C of Table 1b reports the mean values of the variables during the years 
when an issuance occurs. The value of Issue is much larger (.209) in the SEO Only 
sample compared to that of the All Issuance sample (.03), due to the All Issuance sample 
containing a larger number of smaller issuance observations. This can also explain why 
the average Cash Change for a firm is much larger in the SEO Issuance Only Sample 
compared to the All Issuance Sample. The rest of the paper will only utilize the SEO 
Issuance Only Sample for reasons explained above in the Sample Construction section. 
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Descriptive statistics for variables related to the institutional ownership sample 
are presented in Table 2. Panel B reports the mean institutional ownership present in a 
firm for this sample to be 32%, and the median institutional ownership to be 26%,wow of 
total outstanding shares. The median total institutional ownership of the sample firms 
with non-zero institutional ownership is 26%. Of the 127,828 total firm-year observations 
in the sample, 66,640 of those firm-year observations occur when firms have institutional 
ownership of greater than 20%. Additionally, 8.78% of those firm-years with greater than 
20% ownership coincide with an equity issuance. As shown in Panel C of Table 2, the 
average size of the issuance, scaled by total assets from the year below, decreases as the 
institutional ownership present in the firm increases. Thus, if I do find that institutional 
ownership is correlated with greater cash savings from equity issuance, it is not simply a 
mechanical result that institutional ownership is more often found in companies with 
larger issues.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Following Harford et al. (2012), the first hypothesis considered here is that firms 
with greater external monitoring have lower agency costs of holding cash; therefore, their 
optimal corporate cash holdings levels are greater. Thus, there is a greater propensity to 
save share issuance proceeds as cash when outside blockholders are present to monitor 
the firm if the firm is cash-constrained prior to the issuance. Following Opler et al. 
(1999), the second hypothesis I consider is that, because of managers’ self-interest, there 
is a greater propensity to save share issuance proceeds as cash when the potential for 
managerial entrenchment is greater, as proxied by greater block ownership by managers. 
However, as discussed earlier, an alternative hypothesis, resulting in a similar greater 
propensity to save share issuance proceeds as cash, is that greater block ownership by 
managers leads to a stronger alignment between the manager’s goals and shareholder 
value. I will try to disentangle these two hypotheses later in the paper when I measure 
abnormal stock returns around SEO announcements. 
 
Insider Blockholders as Entrenched Managers 
I first test whether firm-level differences in the types of blockholders in a firm are 
related to higher firm-level cash savings following share issuance. With respect to 
blockholders, I define D(Block) as equal to one if a company has at least one shareholder 
who owns more than 5% of the equity in a given year; zero otherwise. The same 
procedure is used for the other indicator variables that capture the presence of any officer, 
director non-officer, and outside blockholder. I consider whether the presence of these 
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different types of blockholders, who have different incentives regarding cash holdings, 
results in firms exhibiting different propensities to save share issuance proceeds as cash.  
I estimate the regression found in Eq. (1) below, and generalize the model to 
include dummy variables for the presence of each type of blockholder and interaction 
terms, between Issue and each type of blockholder. This process allows me to capture the 
effect of that blockholder type on the coefficients β3 and β5 that measure the propensity of 
firms to save share issuance proceeds as cash. In a panel regression, I estimate Eq. (1) 
with firm- and year-fixed effects and an Issue*Block Dummy interaction term. The 
regression equation is: 
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 The source of cash coefficients from Eq. (1) can be interpreted as cents saved per 
dollar of cash proceeds. The firm-fixed effect gives each firm its own intercept (αi), and 
this framework relies on within-firm changes over time in the right-hand-side variables to 
explain within-firm changes over time in the left-hand-side variable. As a result, the 
coefficients β3, for Issue*Insider Block Dummy, and β5, for Issue*Outsider Block Dummy, 
are tests of whether within-firm changes in share issuance, in the presence of each type of 
blockholder, cause within-firm changes in cash savings. 
As explained, I classify blockholders into two types: inside and outside. Inside 
blockholders include officer, director non-officer, affiliated, and Employee Share 
Ownership Plan related blockholders. Outside blockholders are those not defined in the 
above categories. Table 3 reveals that insiders have a statistically significantly positive 
effect on cash savings from share issuance proceeds, whereas outsiders have no 
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statistically significant effect on cash savings from share issuance proceeds. This finding 
supports both the hypothesis that managerial entrenchment leads to a greater propensity 
for firms to save share issuance proceeds as cash as well as the hypothesis that greater 
incentive alignment by managers leads to a greater propensity for firms to save share 
issuance proceeds as cash.  
When examining the influence of outside blockholders, I do not find that these 
blockholders have a significant effect on the propensity to save cash from equity issuance 
proceeds. Prior studies, specifically Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2007), find only a weak negative relationship between blockholders and 
corporate cash holdings; therefore, the smaller sample size (only equity issuance and 
fewer years of data), could explain why I do not find any significance. 
In Table 4, I use the same basic specification as in Table 3, but differentiate the β3 
coefficient on the Issue*Insider Block Dummy interaction term using the different types 
of insider blockholders. I find that firms with at least one officer blockholder are more 
inclined to save share issuance proceeds as cash; however the coefficient is significant 
only at the 10% level. Column 3 of Table 4 shows that, once I add both officer 
blockholders and director blockholders to the same regression, the presence of officer 
blockholder is no longer statistically significantly correlated to cash savings that are a 
result of share issuance. In addition, there appears to be no correlation between changes 
in cash and the presence of a blockholder, director non-officer blockholder, or outside 
blockholder. My evidence on managerial entrenchment, as suggested by the correlation 
between the presence of an officer blockholder and increased share-issuance cash 
savings, supports Chen and Yur-Austin’s (2007) finding that officer blockholders are the 
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only types that do not significantly deter managerial extravagance. Table 4 also reveals 
that the presence of director non-officer blockholders has a negative relationship to total 
cash savings, although not to cash savings that are specifically as a result of share 
issuance. 
I next examine whether my finding of a positive association between managerial 
blockholders and share issuance-cash savings could explain McLean’s (2011) findings 
that R&D, a proxy for precautionary motives, is related to the systematic increase in cash 
savings from share issuance over time. Harford et al. (2008) find that R&D is generally 
unrelated to the cash position of a firm and negatively related to its G-Index, thus 
stronger shareholder rights are correlated with higher R&D.  Firms with weaker 
shareholder rights and high cash tend to invest less in R&D. In Table 5, I show that my 
finding related to the presence of officer blockholders is robust to controlling for R&D, in 
fact in Column 6 of Table 5, the effect is shown to be stronger statistically, as it is 
significant at the 5% level.2 
I then test whether my results concerning the relationship between managerial 
blockholders and share issuance-cash savings remain statistically significant after 
controlling for a number of other determinants, which Dittmar and Duchin (2011) show 
are also significantly correlated with changes in the cash holdings of firms. These 
controls include the financing deficit, capturing the flow-of-funds deficit, defined as cash 
dividends plus capital expenditures; changes in net working capital (less cash); and the 
                                                                
2 In unreported results, I also run the same tests as reported in Tables 4 and 5, but use the sample containing 
all issues rather than only secondary equity offerings. Here, the estimated coefficient on officer blocks is no 
longer statistically different from zero when looking at all issues. However, a statistically significantly 
negative effect occurs on share issuance cash savings by director non-officer blockholders.  
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current portion of long-term debt due, less operating cash flow, in which all variables are 
scaled by the total assets from the previous year. Dittmar and Duchin also used the 
following controls: Age, Net Working Capital, Capital Expenditures, R&D, Acquisitions, 
and Payout (see Appendix A). All ratio variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. In Table 6, I report that a positive significant relation between the presence of 
an officer blockholder and cash savings is still present after controlling for these 
additional variables. I also find a significant negative relation between the presence of a 
director non-officer blockholder on cash savings, which suggests that these types of 
blockholders can help reduce managerial entrenchment.  
 
Institutional Investors as Monitors 
As an alternative to the types of blockholders I have studied so far, I examine the 
effects that different levels of holdings by institutional owners may have on propensities 
of firms to save share issuance proceeds as cash. I assert that this alternative measure of 
concentrated ownership, while it arguably does not capture the degree of direct 
involvement often ascribed to outside blockholders, can nevertheless proxy for the 
monitoring component of corporate governance within a firm. Here, the interest is in 
indicator variables for the presence of different intervals of total percentage holdings by 
institutional owners for a given firm in a given year. Accordingly, I define D (20% or 
greater holdings) equal to one if the total institutional ownership in the firm is more than 
20% of firm equity in a given year, and equal to zero otherwise. The same procedure is 
used for the other indicator variables to capture the different amounts of institutional 
ownership.  
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For these new institutional holdings regressions, I employ the same dependent 
variable (ΔCash) and independent variables (Issue, Debt Proceeds, Cash Flow, Other, 
and Assets) used in the blockholder regressions. Initially, I specify a continuous variable 
for the percentage of total shares held by institutional owners of a firm as well as an 
interaction term between the total institutional ownership percentage and Issue to capture 
the effect of the institutional ownership percentage on the estimated coefficient that 
measures the propensities of firms to save share issuance proceeds as cash. In Table 7 
Column 2, I find that firms with greater amounts of total institutional ownership are more 
inclined to save share issuance proceeds as cash. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
firms with greater external monitoring have lower agency costs of holding cash; and thus 
their optimal amount of corporate cash holdings is higher. If this is the case, they are 
inclined to save more issuance proceeds as cash compared to other firms. It is important 
to note that I interpret a similar coefficient differently with institutional holdings than I do 
for the results on officer blockholders. I argue that higher cash savings by firms with 
officer blocks is more likely a non-optimal result of managerial entrenchment whereas 
higher cash savings by firms with greater institutional ownership is a result of the optimal 
level of cash being higher for those firms. I continue to further strengthen the results in 
support of these hypotheses later in the paper. 
In Columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 7, I introduce dummy variables for the presence 
of different levels of total institutional ownership in a firm as well as an interaction term 
between Issue and each indicator dummy variable to capture the effect of the proportion 
of institutional investor holdings on the estimated propensities of a firm to save share 
issuance proceeds as cash. I find that firms with 5%-20% and those with 20% or more 
30 
total institutional ownership have significantly greater cash savings from equity issuance 
compared to other firms. However, firms with 0% to 5% total institutional ownership 
have significantly less cash savings from equity issuance. I cannot include all types of 
institutional investment in one regression, in order to invert the matrix. However in 
Columns 6, 7, and 8 of Table 7, I run the model with different combinations of two of the 
three sub-groups. The results are materially the same as reported above except when 
running a model with both a dummy for greater than 20% institutional ownership and a 
dummy for less than 5% institutional ownership, as shown in Column 8 of Table 7. In 
this case, the coefficient for cash savings from share issuance with greater than 20% 
institutional ownership is no longer significant. However, this same coefficient is 
significant when including both a dummy for greater than 20% institutional ownership 
and a dummy for between 5% and 20% institutional ownership in the model. The 
coefficient on the interaction between the dummy for less than 5% institutional 
ownership and cash savings from share issuance is negative and significant across all 
these models. This suggests that the significant difference in cash savings from equity 
issuance is found when comparing firms with greater than 5% institutional ownership to 
those with less than 5% institutional ownership. 
The findings from Table 7 suggest that, if the monitoring hypothesis is true, a 
substantial proportion of institutional investors must be present in the firm for the 
monitoring to be sufficient to enable these firms to save more cash from share issuance. 
One possible explanation is that firms with only small amounts of institutional ownership 
face greater asymmetric information costs. Under this premise, it may be more difficult 
for these firms to issue SEOs because shareholders may demand that they provide more 
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information about exactly what they plan to do with the issuance proceeds. Thus, firms 
with low institutional ownership might be constrained to issue equity only at the time 
they are ready to invest. 
If the level of institutional ownership is low, these institutions may understand 
that monitoring is too costly. These institutions may pressure firms to invest the cash 
quickly after an equity issuance, rather than save it, to avoid the free cash flow problem. 
However, low levels of institutional ownership also likely result in less ability by these 
monitors to place pressure on a firm. Perhaps, as total institutional ownership in a firm 
increases, the issuance size (dollars raised) increases as well, which could be why I find 
greater cash savings with the presence of these types of investors. However, as reported 
in Table 2 Panel C, it seems that issuance size does not increase with total institutional 
ownership in a firm on average. In fact, I find that it actually decreases.3 To reconcile the 
resulting significantly higher levels of cash savings among firms with higher levels of 
institutional ownership, and the lack of significant results when looking at outside 
blockholders in my Dlugosz et al. data set, reported in Table 3, it is important to note that 
these two samples are very different. Outside blockholders from Dlugosz et al. must hold 
at least 5% of firm shares to be included in this sample. The institutional ownership 
                                                                
3 It is also important to consider that institutional investors are not all the same. One clear difference across 
these types of investors is their investment strategies, specifically seen in their portfolio turnover rates. 
Harford et al. (2012) argue that investors with longer investment horizons have stronger incentives to monitor 
than do those with shorter investment horizons. Given that long-term investors can credibly threaten to sell 
their shares, costs of monitoring are lower and benefits are greater compared to short-term investors. Harford 
et al. find that firms with institutional shareholders who have longer investment horizons, measured by 
portfolio turnover, do in fact hold more cash. They do not look at the effect of this assumed monitoring on 
cash changes as a result of share issuance; rather they consider the effect of this monitoring simply on the 
total level of corporate cash holdings. However, in unreported tests I find that indicators for the presence of 
long- and short-term institutional investors in firms are both only weakly positively correlated with cash 
savings from equity issuance. It also appears that firms with short-term institutional investors save more cash 
from equity issuance compared to firms with long-term institutional investors.  
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sample examines all combined holdings by institutions, not just by those who own 5% or 
more of the firm. Also, it could be that the manner in which these outside blockholders 
monitor firms is different from the way institutions monitor management. Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988) show that voting on governance increases with institutional 
ownership. Institutional investors have long been associated with shareholder activism 
and are required to participate in proxy votes as part of their fiduciary duty. Alexander, 
Chen, Seppi, and Spatt (2010) find that institutions often vote based on the 
recommendations of proxy advisers such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). This 
activity can intensify coordinated voting, which can be critical in votes against 
management. It could be the case that this coordination, combined with lower costs to 
monitoring, can lead to more persuasive monitoring by institutions compared to simply 
outside blockholders when it comes to a firm’s cash decisions. 
 
Permanent or Transitory Cash Change after SEO 
Next, I investigate whether these cash increases after equity issuance are 
permanent or transitory. Jensen (1986) contends that the optimal amount of cash holdings 
is driven by the tradeoff between having enough cash to finance profitable projects, but 
not so much cash that managers can easily waste it on unprofitable projects that benefit 
the manager at the expense of shareholders. A degree of financial slack is useful for 
future financial flexibility as cash security nets allow firms to invest in the future without 
having to access external capital markets. In so doing, firms avert transaction costs, on 
either debt or equity issuance, and information asymmetry costs that are often coupled 
with equity issues. If the increase in cash savings when insider blockholders are present is 
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sub-optimal because of increased agency conflicts, I expect that any cash increase will be 
transitory because managers will waste it quickly. It is possible that a transitory cash 
change is simply a result of these firms investing quickly in positive NPV projects. 
However, I have no reason to believe that these firms would be able to identify positive 
NPV projects any more readily than those firms without insider blockholders. Even if a 
firm does not waste the proceeds quickly, holding cash can also be sub-optimal if 
shareholders would rather have the cash savings disbursed back to them because interest 
earned on corporate cash reserves is double-taxed at both the corporate and individual 
levels. Thus, it is unclear whether to expect permanent or transitory increases in cash 
from equity issuance with the presence of inside blockholders.  
To better understand this setting, I examine whether insider and outsider 
blockholders are associated with different influences on the level of cash in the years 
following SEOs. I find that firms without any blockholders have the least amount of 
change in their cash holdings over a five-year period following an SEO, with a decrease 
in cash by a little less than 1%. Firms having at least one officer blockholder experience a 
decrease in cash by approximately 24% in the five years after an SEO compared to 12% 
for firms with at least one outside blockholder. This finding that firms with a least one 
officer blockholder disgorge cash more quickly after an SEO supports the hypothesis that 
cash increases from SEOs when insiders are present are more transitory compared to 
those for firms with other types of blockholders.  
In Figure 1, I display a bar graph of the average change in cash for each year 
following the year-end after equity issuance (first through fifth year). Cash is scaled by 
total assets and Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Cash in year t is scaled by 
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total assets in year t. Firms with no blockholders decrease cash on average by more than 
4% initially, and gradually reduce this percentage over time until it is only at -0.8% by 
year five. Those firms with one officer blockholder present decrease their cash, on 
average, by 12.5% in the first fiscal year following the year that the SEO occurred. To 
put this finding in perspective, a 12.5% decrease in the first year is larger than the 
average for all other firms after five years; almost the entire decrease in cash occurs 
within two years of the SEO. For example, firms with at least one officer blockholder 
quickly decrease their average cash by almost 23% in two years with a final change in 
cash of 24% by year five. This is double the decrease compared to all other types of 
blockholders.  
In Panel A of Table 8, I separate firms into groups (outside and officer 
blockholders) and report their four-year change in cash. The four-year mean and median 
of the cash change for the two groups differ largely; the cash change for officer directors 
decreases the most. However, I conclude that the cash change after SEOs for these two 
groups is not significantly different. Specifically, I find that the two groups are 
significantly different when using the two-sample t-test; however, significance is not 
reached when using the Wilcoxon test. This discrepancy might be explained by the fact 
that my sample of officer blockholders is small and contains a few outliers; the Wilcoxon 
test is less sensitive to outliers than is the two-sample t-test. Lastly in Panel A of Table 8, 
I find a statistically significant difference between the average four-year cash change for 
firms with at least one officer blockholder and those with no officer blockholder.  
Next, I estimate a target cash level for each firm following the methodology 
described in Appendix B. Excess cash is defined as the difference between actual cash 
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and predicted cash. In Figure 2, I report the estimated excess cash for firms by year, 
beginning four years prior to the SEO and ending five years after the SEO. I report 
estimated excess cash for firms with at least one outside blockholder and separately for 
firms with at least one officer blockholder. According to my excess cash calculation, 
firms with at least one officer blockholder yield higher excess cash during the year of the 
SEO (14.45%) on average, whereas firms with at least one outside blockholder yield only 
9.75% excess cash on average.  
Firms with at least one officer blockholder appear to revert to their estimated 
target level of cash much more quickly following the SEO, reaching 2.75% excess cash 
five years after the SEO. In contrast, firms with at least one outside blockholder maintain 
almost the same level of positive excess cash even five years after the SEO. In Panel B of 
Table 8, I show that the mean and median of estimated excess cash, four years after the 
SEO, is higher for firms with at least one outside blockholder compared to those with at 
least one officer blockholder. However, the excess cash for these two groups is not 
significantly different.  
I next consider the change in operating income over the four-year period 
following the SEO for each of the four subsamples. In Panel C of Table 8, I report that 
firms with at least one officer blockholder have the largest decrease in operating income 
in the four years following the SEO, with an average decrease in operating income of 
8.63%. However, this decrease is not significantly different from that for firms with at 
least one outside blockholder. These firms, on average, decrease operating income by 
8.06% over four years.  
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I next broaden my comparison to include the effect of outside directors on cash 
savings over time following the SEO by examining blockholdings of firms by 
institutional investors. When considering holdings by institutional investors, my 
hypothesis is that the optimal cash holdings of firms will be higher when greater levels of 
monitoring are present, due to decreased agency costs. However, I am not certain how to 
predict whether the cash increase following an SEO will be more or less permanent for 
firms with greater monitoring. As shown in Panel A of Table 9, when the combined 
institutional investor ownership exceeds 20% of the value of a firm, the average cash 
decrease is 41% in the four years after the SEO. This decrease is much greater than are 
the values reported for outside versus inside blockholdings. Additionally, this change in 
cash falls even more when looking at the average for firms with 5% to 20% institutional 
investor holdings, with an average cash decrease of 57% over four years; those with less 
than 5% institutional ownership experience an average cash decrease of 61% over four 
years. Figure 3 shows that these changes in cash stay fairly consistent over the entire five-
year period.  
Panel A of Table 9 also breaks out three different comparisons of firms. First, it 
reports the difference in changes of cash for firms with and without institutional 
ownership. Second, it reports the difference in changes of cash for firms with institutional 
ownership below 5% and those with greater than 5%. Lastly, it reports the difference in 
changes of cash for firms with institutional ownership between 5% and 20% to those with 
greater than 20%. All of these groups yield significantly different changes in cash over 
four years; those firms with the highest level of institutional ownership have the smallest 
change in cash following the SEO. Panel C of Table 9 also shows that those firms with 
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greater than 5% institutional ownership have significantly lower operating incomes than 
do those firms with less than 5%.   
It is clear from these results that the presence of institutional investor holdings is 
correlated with a large decrease in cash following an SEO; however the decrease in cash 
is statistically significantly less for firms with higher institutional ownership levels. This 
finding could be the result of pressure on firms from institutions to pay out, invest faster, 
or institutional investors’ abilities to recognize firms with greater investment 
opportunities. I do not attempt to distinguish between these possibilities in this paper. 
As reported in Panel D of Table 9, the median total assets increased by close to 
60% for all samples. To investigate whether acquisitions drive (a) these large increases in 
total assets and (b) the resulting cash changes, I remove firms with acquisitions of greater 
than $10 million during the five-year period following the SEO from the sample. The 
magnitude of these cash decreases is even greater after these firms are removed. Thus, I 
conclude it is not merely firm acquisitions that drive these large increases in total assets 
during the period following an SEO.  
To explore whether this change in cash is a result of changing fundamentals of the 
firm, it would be more interesting to consider how far firms are from an estimated target 
level of cash in these years. I use the same estimated excess cash calculations mentioned 
above with subsamples of firms having different levels of institutional ownership. As 
shown in Figure 4, it is clear that firms with different levels of institutional ownership 
hold unique levels of estimated excess cash. For example, firms with less than 5% 
institutional ownership have, on average, negative estimated excess cash throughout the 
entire sample period surrounding the SEO; although the magnitude of the negative 
38 
estimated excess cash is substantially smaller and stays at a consistent level following the 
SEO. Firms with between 5% and 20% institutional ownership have, on average, 
negative excess cash for the years prior to the SEO and positive estimated excess cash for 
the years subsequent to the SEO. This is evidence suggesting that these firms are below 
their optimal level of cash holdings before the SEO and re-adjust their overall level of 
cash holdings closer to their target using proceeds from the SEO. Firms with greater than 
20% institutional ownership have, on average, positive estimated excess cash for the 
entire sample period surrounding the SEO; however, these firms experience a large jump 
up following the SEO.  
The magnitude of the estimated excess cash is greater across the board in Figure 4 
for firms with over 20% institutional ownership. If firms are behaving well, i.e. making 
value-enhancing decisions, then the movement in excess cash around the SEO for these 
firms with higher levels of monitoring could support the hypothesis that firms with 
greater outside monitoring will have a higher optimal level of cash. If this hypothesis is 
true, then the estimated target level of cash that I measure using the Opler et al. (1999) 
methodology is not reflecting this additional increase to the target level, found with 
higher levels of monitoring. It would make sense then, assuming that this story is true, 
that firms with greater monitoring would seem to hold more cash, on average, than the 
level that the target model predicts. Thus I might observe a firm, with high levels of 
institutional ownership, that appears to be already over the optimal level of cash 
according to the Opler et al. model just before the SEO, but in reality, it is below its true 
unobserved optimal level before the SEO and the issuance helps it to rebalance its 
portfolio to a mix that is more consistent with its true unobserved target. 
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Panel B of Table 9 compares the same three groups discussed in relation to Panel 
A of Table 9.  Both the mean and median estimated excess cash, four years after the SEO 
for firms with less than 5% institutional ownership, are significantly lower than are those 
for firms with greater than 5% institutional ownership. In addition, both the mean and 
median estimated excess cash, four years after the SEO for firms with between 5% and 
20% institutional ownership, are significantly lower than are the analogous mean and 
median for firms with greater than 20% institutional ownership. For the same reasons 
given above, I interpret these results to support the hypothesis that firms with greater 
outside monitoring will have a higher optimal level of cash than what my model implies. 
 
Market Reaction to SEO 
Next, I investigate the stock market reaction to SEO announcements in my 
blockholder sample. I calculate cumulative abnormal returns following the method used 
in Fama and French (2003) and measure them over a seven-day interval centered around 
the event’s announcement date. As a robustness check, I also run the same (unreported) 
tests using the three-day interval centered around the event’s announcement date, as well 
as tests which add a momentum factor to the model, as discussed in Carhart (1997). In 
these (unreported) tests, I find that the regression results pertaining to the announcement 
period abnormal returns were qualitatively similar across the alternative methods. To 
identify the announcement date of the SEO, I follow Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2004) 
and Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), where the filing date provided by SDC is 
used as the announcement date for the equity issues. If a firm has more than one SEO in 
the same fiscal year, I drop all observations in that year after the first occurrence.  
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In Table 10, I break out the average returns for my blockholder sample for two 
cases: (a) when a firm has excess cash and (b) when a firm does not have excess cash. 
Panel A of Table 10 measures excess cash at the year-end prior to the SEO. Panel B of 
Table 10 measures excess cash at year-end for the year when the SEO takes place. I also 
break out cases where firms have an outside blockholder compared to cases where firms 
have an officer blockholder. Approximately 55% of the firms (94 of 171) with an outside 
blockholder present have estimated excess cash at the year-end prior to the SEO, whereas 
59% of these firms (101 of 171) have estimated excess cash by the year-end following 
the SEO. Approximately 50% of the firms (16 of 32) with an officer blockholder present 
have excess cash at the year-end prior to the SEO, whereas 59% of these firms (19 of 32) 
have excess cash by the year-end following the SEO. Thus the percentage of firms with 
an outside blockholder that have excess cash before the SEO is greater than the 
percentage of firms with an officer blockholder that have excess cash before the SEO; 
however the percentage with excess after the SEO is approximately the same for both 
groups.  
When an outside blockholder is present, abnormal returns surrounding the SEO 
announcement are not significantly different whether the firm falls below or above the 
target cash estimation. This evidence suggests that the market is not overly concerned 
with excess cash at the time of an SEO if outside blockholders are present to monitor the 
firm. However, when an officer blockholder is present, the market reacts significantly 
more negatively if the firm has estimated excess cash before an SEO compared to its 
reaction if the firm does not have estimated excess cash before the SEO. Given the 
presence of an officer blockholder, the average abnormal return for a firm with excess 
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cash is approximately -5%, whereas when there is no excess cash the year before the SEO 
the average return is approximately -1%. Among firms with excess cash, the median 
abnormal return for firms with both officer blockholders before the SEO is -5.46% 
whereas the median return for firms with both outside blockholders is -2.26%. However 
these two groups are not statistically significantly different, possibly due to the smaller 
sample size for the subset with officer directors compared to the rest of the sample.  
These results for firms with officer blockholders helps to disentangle the 
competing hypotheses about why I observe firms save more cash from equity issuance 
when officer blockholders are present, as noted in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Insider 
blockholdings can lead to greater managerial entrenchment and the potential for non-
value-enhancing uses of cash proceeds. However, insider blockholdings can also lead to 
stronger incentive alignment between managers and shareholder value, reducing 
incentives that lead to value destruction. Herein lies the significance of the result that, 
when an officer blockholder is present, the average return for a firm is significantly more 
negative when that firm has excess cash than the average return for firms with no excess 
cash the year before the SEO. This suggests that investors are worried about the potential 
misuse of issuance proceeds when officer blockholders are present. Thus the evidence 
seems to suggest that managerial entrenchment is the dominant influence governing the 
effect of officer blockholdings. 
In Table 11, I report estimates from a regression relating announcement period 
returns to the presence of these different types of blockholders. I do not find a significant 
relation between the different types of blockholdings nor do I find a significant relation 
when I include in the model the level of excess cash both for the year before, and the year 
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of, an SEO. This unfortunately does not help to disentangle the two competing 
hypotheses concerning officer directors discussed above. 
Next, I consider the market reaction to the SEO announcements in my 
institutional ownership sample. In Table 12, I break out the average returns in three 
different categories of institutional ownership for both when a firm has estimated excess 
cash and when a firm does not have estimated excess cash. Analogous to Table 10, Panel 
A of Table 12 measures estimated excess cash at year-end prior to the SEO. Panel B of 
Table 12 measures estimated excess cash at year-end for the year in which the SEO takes 
place. Approximately 80% of firms with less than 5% institutional ownership have 
estimated excess cash at year-end prior to the SEO, whereas approximately 73% of these 
same firms have estimated excess cash by the year-end following the SEO. 
Approximately 68% of firms with between 5% and 20% institutional ownership have 
excess cash at year-end prior to the SEO. This percentage drops only a tiny amount, to 
67%, by the year-end following the SEO. Lastly, approximately 55% of the firms with 
greater than 20% institutional ownership present have estimated excess cash at year-end 
prior to the SEO, whereas more of these firms, approximately 61%, have estimated 
excess cash by the year-end following the SEO. Thus it seems that firms with greater 
levels institutional ownership are less likely to have excess cash, both before and after an 
SEO. 
Whether a firm is above or below the estimated cash target does not seem to 
significantly affect market returns on average, no matter how much institutional 
ownership is present in the firm. I find that when firms do not have excess cash before or 
after the SEO, their returns are basically very similar (i.e. approximately -4%), regardless 
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of how much institutional ownership is present in the firm. I do see some variation in 
returns across different levels of institutional ownership according to whether the firm 
does or does not have excess cash both the year before, and the year of, an SEO. Returns 
are the least negative when there is less than 5% institutional ownership present in the 
firm. If greater institutional ownership leads to greater monitoring, then investors should 
be less worried about the use of the issuance proceeds if the institutional ownership is 
higher. However my results in Table 10 seem not to support this hypothesis. I am not sure 
how to interpret these split-sample comparisons; so I next estimate some regressions to 
see whether additional controls might add further clarity. 
Numerous studies document that SEO announcements generate negative stock 
price reactions. However, Demiralp et al. (2011) find that announcement returns 
surrounding SEOs are positively correlated with overall institutional ownership levels 
and concentration, which suggests that the market believes there are monitoring benefits 
to such ownership. In Table 13, I find consistently higher announcement returns with 
greater institutional ownership, across all eight alternative specifications. In model 2 of 
Table 13, I add to the literature by controlling for the level of excess cash for both the 
year before and the year of SEO to the regressions. I find that the level of excess cash in 
the year before SEO is weakly negatively related to returns, whereas the level of excess 
cash at the year-end after the SEO is strongly positively related to returns. This seems to 
support the idea that investors are nervous if a firm that already has excess cash, before 
the SEO, decides to issue more equity. However, if investors expect that the firm will not 
spend new cash quickly after the SEO (as proxied by higher excess cash by the year-end 
following the SEO), then they are less concerned about the issuance. However, once I 
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control for other governance measures using the G-Index and E-Index, as in models 7 and 
8 in Table 13, I find that the previously significant coefficients on excess cash become 
insignificant, suggesting that once governance is controlled for in the regression to 
explain announcement period returns, investors may not be as worried about the level of 
excess cash held by the firm.  
 
Future Work on Endogeneity 
I have demonstrated that greater institutional investment in a firm is correlated 
with higher savings of cash from equity issuance. However, it is challenging to establish 
an unambiguous causal relation between institutional ownership and these cash decisions. 
I am concerned that while institutional ownership may lead to differences in cash savings 
after equity issuance, institutional investors may also choose stocks because of 
unobservable firm characteristics that also drive differences in cash savings from equity 
issuance. If these unobservable firm-specific characteristics are time-invariant, the firm-
level fixed effects included in my regression analysis should capture this effect and 
mitigate any concerns about heterogeneity bias. Table 7 revealed that the relationship 
between institutional ownership and propensity to save cash from equity issuances is 
positive and significant despite the inclusion of firm fixed effects.  
Another empirical strategy to address these endogeneity concerns is to utilize a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) across the cutoff based on size that distinguishes 
firms in the Russell 1000 index and the Russell 2000 index. The RDD strategy requires 
an exogenous discontinuous variable that drives selection of observations into a treatment 
or control group in the neighborhood of the discontinuity. The Russell 1000 and Russell 
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2000 indices are constructed based on firms’ market capitalizations. The 1000 largest 
stocks will be included in the Russell 1000 index, and stocks ranked from 1001th to 
3000th will be included in the Russell 2000 index. Mechanically, those just-included 
stocks for the Russell 1000 based on rank and those just-excluded stocks based on rank in 
the Russell 1000 index are very similar in terms of size; however, since both the Russell 
1000 and Russell 2000 indices are market value weighted, the stocks just-included and 
just-excluded will receive very different weights in the index respectively. The weights 
will be different because the smallest firms in the Russell 1000 are a very small fraction 
of the total index and thus not as important for index funds to purchase if fund managers 
are attempting to successfully track the index; whereas the largest firms in the Russell 
2000 are the largest weighted firms in this index and thus the most important firms for 
indexers to purchase to successfully track the Russell 2000 index. As a result of both (a) 
this value weighted issue and (b) the popularity of funds tracking the Russell 2000 over 
the Russell 1000, there is a significant jump in institutional ownership just after the cutoff 
that defines inclusion in the Russell 1000 index. Firms at the top of the Russell 2000 will 
have noticeably greater institutional ownership than firms at the bottom of the Russell 
1000. I propose to investigate whether this relatively exogenous positive shock in 
institutional ownership of a stock stemming from inclusion in the Russell 2000 index 
affects the propensities of firms to save share issuance proceeds as cash.  
This RDD strategy has the benefit of not relying on institutional ownership 
changes for identification. Changes in ownership are not random. It is possible that 
changes in institutional ownership are caused by unobservable determinants related to 
cash decisions. This proposed strategy of using the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indices 
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also has the advantage of being able to observe both the firms included in the index and 
just barely excluded, rather than only those firms that are included, as would be the case 
for the S&P 500 index. Another problem with the S&P 500 index, specifically, is that 
firms might be included in this index because of some expected change in corporate 
policy or performance. Inclusion in the S&P 500 index has been shown to increase 
investor recognition rather than solely increasing benchmarking done by index trackers, 
such as institutional investors. Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) show that stocks which 
are deleted from the S&P 500 index suffer no permanent negative price effect. If the 
observed positive price effect of inclusion in the index is due primarily to indexing by 
institutional investors, then one would expect a negative price effect for deletion when 
institutional demand is decreased. Chang, Hong, and Liskovich (2013) find price effects 
for firms that are added to, and deleted from, the Russell 1000 index. This finding is 
consistent with institutional benchmarking significantly changing at those moments.  
My goal is to understand the relationship between greater monitoring and higher 
levels of cash savings following an SEO. Thus, it is imperative that this proposed RDD 
specification captures a discontinuity in monitoring by institutions. One might be 
concerned that these institutions are simply passive and will not influence corporate 
decisions; however, Edmans (2009) finds that even passive investors help discipline 
managers through the threat of exit. Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2013) utilize this 
same regression discontinuity around the Russell 1000/2000 indices and find that proxy-
voting participation increases by 55 percentage points for firms randomly exposed to 
higher institutional ownership, consistent with monitoring activity by institutional 
investors. Although institutional investors are required to participate in proxy votes by 
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law, Alexander et al. (2010) report that institutions often vote based on the 
recommendations of proxy advisers such as ISS. This activity can intensify coordinated 
voting, which can be critical in votes against management. Thus, even if the increase 
around the discontinuity is of passive institutions, these firms at the top of the Russell 
2000 will still benefit from greater monitoring. Consistent with this idea, Crane et al. 
(2013) also show that when randomly exposed to 9% higher institutional ownership using 
this RDD design, firms pay 13% more dividends and repurchase 22% more of their 
shares.  
Unfortunately, I do not yet have access to all of the data needed to complete this 
proposed RDD specification. Russell does not publish historical lists of the firms 
comprising each year’s index, only the current constituent list today. I have replicated the 
Russell index employing CRSP market capitalizations using the May 31st calculation 
date each year. However there are limitations to this method as Russell itself makes 
adjustments to this list each year. First, Russell has had a policy since 2007 called 
“banding” where they try to maintain consistency for firms in their two indices if these 
firms are very close to the border between the two indices. The second adjustment is 
associated with the public float. Once each firm is assigned to an index, Russell then 
assigns index weights based on market capitalization adjusted for investible shares (e.g. 
treasury stock, blockholders etc.). However, the investible shares data are considered 
proprietary by Russell and are not made available to the public. Crane et al. (2013) report 
that this adjustment can be large in some cases. The other studies that use this RDD 
approach around the boundary between the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000 have 
managed to acquire the actual index constituents for each historical year as released by 
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Russell to try to estimate these changes made by Russell. One option I have is to contact 
the authors of these studies or Russell Investments to see if they might share this 
historical list of firms. In summary, I propose to complete this RDD analysis if I am able 
to obtain the full dataset required in the future.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
I examine the effect of ownership structure on firms’ propensities to save the 
proceeds of a share issuance as cash. Specifically, I focus on changes in cash savings at 
the time of an SEO, a moment at which the firm experiences a large inflow of cash, to 
determine whether ownership structures such as managerial blockholdings or the 
presence of institutional investors materially affect firms’ decisions regarding their level 
of cash savings. This large inflow of cash makes the aftermath of an equity issuance an 
attractive opportunity to explore the relationship between agency problems and cash 
holdings. I venture two hypotheses, based on the current literature that concern the 
possible influences of ownership structure and the resulting agency problems, concerning 
what firms do with issuance proceeds after an SEO.  
I first consider Opler et al. (1999) who reason that managers inherently wish to 
accumulate cash in excess of the level that maximizes firm value because they are risk 
averse or they want flexibility to pursue personal objectives or perquisites. This desire for 
excess cash would lead to greater cash savings for firms with managers who are more 
likely to be entrenched. Thus, firms with greater insider blockholdings should have a 
greater propensity to hold share issuance proceeds as cash.  
I then consider Harford et al. (2012), who reason that firms with greater external 
monitoring have lower agency costs of holding cash and, thus, the optimal level of 
corporate cash holdings is greater. Higher institutional ownership and outsider 
blockholdings will arguably increase monitoring and lessen the extent of agency costs, 
which will increase the optimal level of cash holdings for a firm. Thus, firms with greater 
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external monitoring would be inclined to save a greater share of their issuance proceeds 
as cash. 
I find that firms with managerial blockholders are more inclined to save share 
issuance proceeds as cash, relative to firms with outside blockholders or no blockholders 
present. This finding could be interpreted as consistent with either managerial 
entrenchment or incentive alignment, so I distinguish between these competing forces by 
examining SEO announcement returns. The market’s reaction to SEO announcements 
when managerial blockholders are present is significantly worse on average when the 
firm has excess cash, lending support to the entrenchment explanation.  
I also find that firms with greater total institutional ownership save more cash 
from equity issuance. In addition, I show that firms with high levels of institutional 
ownership have higher levels of cash than what is predicted by a standard cash target 
model. These results are consistent with the theory that greater firm monitoring allows 
optimal corporate cash holdings to increase because shareholders are less concerned 
about potential misuses of cash.  
This paper emphasizes that examination of changes in cash, rather than solely 
levels of cash, is an insightful opportunity to investigate when considering the effects of 
ownership structure, specifically when considering agency problems, on cash decisions 
made by firms. In addition, this paper furthers our understanding of the forces that drive 
McLean’s (2011) and Kim and Weisbach’s (2008) results that firms save a substantial 
fraction of the cash raised in SEOs.   
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
(Compustat codes in parentheses) 
Cash:  Cash and equivalents scaled by the book value of assets measured 
at the beginning of the year. (chet / att-1) 
 
ΔCash:  Cash and equivalents minus previous cash and equivalents scaled by 
the book value of assets measured at the beginning of the year.  
((che t - che t-1) / att-1) 
 
Issue:  Cash proceeds from seasoned equity offerings, measured using 
SDC, scaled by the book value of assets measured at the beginning 
of the year.  
 
Debt:  Cash proceeds from debt sales scaled by the book value of assets 
measured at the beginning of the year. (dltist / att-1)  
 
Cash flow:  Net income plus amortization and depreciation scaled by the book 
value of assets measured at the beginning of the year.  
((ni+dp)t / att-1) 
 
Other:  The sum of other cash sources; sale of investments; and sale of 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by the book value of assets 
measured at the beginning of the year. ((sppe + siv + fsrco)t / att-1) 
 
Assets:   Natural log of total assets. (log(att)) 
 
R&D:  Research and development expense scaled by the book value of 
assets measured at the beginning of the year. (xrdt / att-1) 
 
Insiders:   Officer blockholders, director non-officer blockholders, affiliated 
blockholders, and Employee Share Ownership Plan related 
blockholders. 
 
Finance Deficit:  The sum of cash dividends, capital expenditures, changes in net 
working capital (less cash) and current portion of long-term debt 
due, less operating cash flow, in which all variables are scaled by 
the book value of assets measured at the beginning of the year.  
(dvtt + capxt + wcapcht + dd1t - nit - dpt) / att-1) 
 
Age:   The number of years since the firm’s IPO. 
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Net Working Capital:  Net working capital minus cash and equivalents scaled by the book 
value of assets measured at the beginning of the year.  
((wcap - che)t / att-1) 
 
Capital Expenditure:  Capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets measured at 
the beginning of the year. (capxt / att-1) 
 
Acquisitions:  Acquisitions scaled by the book value of assets measured at the 
beginning of the year. (aqct / att-1) 
 
Payout:  The sum of preferred dividends, common dividends, and share 
repurchases scaled by the book value of assets measured at the 
beginning of the year. (dvpt + dvct + prstkct) / att-1) 
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APPENDIX B 
MEASURING EXCESS CASH  
This section of the appendix describes the methodology used to estimate excess cash 
holdings. The excess cash estimation is based on Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007), who documented how best to control for the main motivations for a firm to 
hold cash. Following these studies, I first estimate a regression to measure a predicted, 
normal level of cash holdings of a firm. I then calculate the difference between actual and 
predicted cash of the firm to find the excess cash. The following regression equation 
represents my main specification: 
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    (B1)
 
 
where (Compustat codes in parentheses):  Cash is cash and equivalents (che); NA is net 
assets (at-che), FCF is earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes, but before depreciation 
(ni+dp); NWC is current assets minus current liabilities minus cash (act-lct-che); Industry 
Sigma is the industry average of the prior 10-year standard deviation of FCF/NA; MV is 
total assets minus stockholders equity minus deferred taxes plus preferred stock plus 
common shares times price (at-seq-txdb+pstkl)+(csho*prcc_f); and RD is R&D 
expenditures (xrd), set to zero if missing. All assets are adjusted for inflation. The residuals 
from the regression, including firm-fixed effects, are used to compute excess cash. 
  
FIGURES AND TABLES
APPENDIX C
Figure 1 displays the average change in cash for each year after equity issuance (first through fifth year) given the presence of
different types of blockholders. t=1 is the change in cash from the year of the SEO to the year following the SEO. t=1 is the
change in cash over 1 year from time of SEO, t=2 is the change in cash over 2 years from time of SEO, etc. Cash is scaled by
total assets and Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Cash in year t is scaled by total assets in year t. 
Figure 2 displays the estimated excess cash for firms by year, beginning four years prior to the SEO and ending five years after
the SEO, given the presence of different types of blockholders. t=0 is the excess cash at the year-end of the year that the SEO
was issued. t=1 is the excess cash at the year-end of the year after the SEO, etc. A predicted cash level is estimated for each
firm following the methodology described in Appendix B. Excess cash is defined as the difference between actual cash and
predicted cash. 
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Figure 3 displays the average change in cash for each year after equity issuance (first through fifth year) given
the presence of different levels of institutional holdings. t=1 is the change in cash from the year of the SEO to
the year following the SEO. t=1 is the change in cash over 1 year from time of SEO, t=2 is the change in cash
over 2 years from time of SEO, etc. Cash is scaled by total assets and Winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Cash in year t is scaled by total assets in year t. 
Figure 4 displays the estimated excess cash for firms by year, beginning four years prior to the SEO and ending
five years after the SEO, given the presence of different levels of institutional holdings. t=0 is the excess cash at
the year-end of the year that the SEO was issued. t=1 is the excess cash at the year-end of the year after the
SEO, etc. A predicted cash level is estimated for each firm following the methodology described in Appendix
B. Excess cash is defined as the difference between actual cash and predicted cash. 
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Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Cash Change (ΔCash) 0.00 0.02 0.11 -0.46 1.42 6183 0.00 0.02 0.12 -0.46 1.42 5952
Issue 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.73 6183 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.00 1.83 5952
Debt Proceeds 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.00 1.70 6183 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.00 1.84 5952
Cash Flow 0.10 0.10 0.12 -1.14 0.65 6183 0.10 0.10 0.12 -1.14 0.66 5952
Other 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.78 6183 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.79 5952
Assets 7.13 7.27 1.41 1.84 10.19 6183 7.13 7.25 1.41 1.84 10.22 5952
R&D 0.00 70.92 203.48 0.00 1181.19 6183 0.00 70.63 206.04 0.00 1181.19 5952
# Block 2.00 2.40 1.61 0.00 11.00 6183 2.00 2.41 1.61 0.00 11.00 5952
# Officer Block 0.00 0.19 0.47 0.00 4.00 6183 0.00 0.19 0.47 0.00 4.00 5952
# Director Non-Officer Block 0.00 0.11 0.37 0.00 4.00 6183 0.00 0.11 0.37 0.00 4.00 5952
# Outside Block 2.00 1.87 1.51 0.00 9.00 6183 2.00 1.88 1.51 0.00 9.00 5952
% Block 21.40 23.82 17.49 0.00 92.00 6183 21.40 23.87 17.44 0.00 92.00 5952
% Officer Block 0.00 2.53 7.49 0.00 67.20 6183 0.00 2.53 7.52 0.00 67.20 5952
% Director Non-Officer Block 0.00 1.27 5.19 0.00 83.70 6183 0.00 1.28 5.14 0.00 62.50 5952
% Outside Block 14.40 16.80 14.67 0.00 82.20 6183 14.40 16.87 14.70 0.00 82.20 5952
All SEO Proceeds 0.00 7.44 77.99 0.00 3645.45 6183
All Issuance Proceeds 5.00 49.42 229.31 -1.44 9204.00 5952
Total Assets 1252.35 4241.49 7912.17 78.68 46408.00 6183 1243.25 4083.06 7426.25 77.77 42343.00 5952
Acquisitions 0.00 121.29 625.37 -4507.00 18610.00 5715 0.00 110.91 517.25 -2145.00 15576.00 5514
Capital Exp. 70.11 316.59 952.43 0.00 17633.00 6096 69.87 295.87 846.77 0.00 17633.00 5872
Cash and Short Term Invest. 56.80 287.29 980.57 -0.16 31600.00 6183 56.39 275.37 944.50 -0.16 31600.00 5952
Long Term Debt Issuance 35.79 399.67 1733.57 0.00 48158.00 6183 35.00 365.27 1426.12 0.00 47645.00 5952
Depreciation 55.00 222.44 637.82 0.00 13657.00 6183 54.39 209.78 592.64 0.03 13657.00 5952
Net Income 52.36 219.66 1192.09 -56121.90 17720.00 6183 51.57 202.27 1150.92 -56121.90 17720.00 5952
R&D 14.80 141.54 464.76 0.00 5094.00 4335 14.55 133.70 438.77 0.00 5094.00 4114
Purchase of C. and Prf. Stock 4.75 112.42 406.80 -0.10 6785.00 4777 4.74 112.53 407.60 -0.10 6785.00 4757
Stockholders Equity - Parent 506.00 1651.59 4438.89 -3768.70 152027.00 6183 498.22 1571.65 4139.07 -3768.70 152027.00 5952
Sale of Investments 0.00 151.96 1287.78 0.00 58715.00 6183 0.00 150.82 1309.11 0.00 58715.00 5952
Sale of Property 0.00 22.42 217.68 -51.94 7345.00 6183 0.00 17.59 159.19 -51.94 6767.00 5952
Sale of Common and Prefer Stock 5.00 49.30 228.95 -1.44 9204.00 5971 5.00 49.42 229.31 -1.44 9204.00 5952
This table displays summary statistics for the primary variables that are used in this study regarding the blockholder sample. ΔCash is the difference between cash at the end of the year and cash at the
beginning of the year. Issue is the cash proceeds from share issuance. Debt is the proceeds from debt sales. Cash flow is cash flow from operations. Other is all other cash sources, which include the sales
of assets and investments. These measures are scaled by total assets measured at the beginning of the year. Assets is the log of total assets. Blockholders are those who own at least 5% of the firm’s equity
in a given year. # Block is the number of all blockholders for that firm-year. # Officer Block is the number of officer director blockholders. # Non-Officer Dir Block is the number of non-officer director
blockholders. # Outside Block is the number of outside blockholders. % Officer Block is the percentage held by officer director blockholders. % Non-Officer Dir Block is the percentage held by non-officer
director blockholders. % Outside Block is the percentage held by outside blockholders. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, with the exception of Issue for the SEO Sample
Only. Observations with Issue greater than 10 are dropped for the SEO Only sample. Panel A consists of only measuring issuance from proceeds of SEOs using the SDC database. Panel A is the sample
used in the rest of this paper. Panel B is the sample when all issuances, not just SEOs, are used. Panel B is for comparison purposes only and is not used in the rest of the paper. The sample consists of
6,183 firm-year observations during the period 1996–2001
Panel A: SEO Issuance Only Sample Panel B: All Issuance Sample
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics - Blockholders
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Panel A: Number of observations with positive versus negative values
# Positive # Zero # Negative # Positive # Zero # Negative
Cash Change (ΔCash) 3502 35 2646 3372 32 2548
Issue 176 6007 0 4911 1041 0
Debt Proceeds 4148 2035 0 3977 1975 0
Cash Flow 5642 0 541 5428 0 524
Other 3442 2741 0 3315 2637 0
Assets 6183 0 0 5952 0 0
R&D 2818 3365 0 2686 3266 0
# Block 5435 748 0 5250 702 0
# Officer Block 995 5188 0 960 4992 0
# Director Non-Officer Block 574 5609 0 553 5399 0
# Outside Block 4860 1323 0 4696 1256 0
% Block 5435 748 0 5250 702 0
% Officer Block 995 5188 0 960 4992 0
% Director Non-Officer Block 574 5609 0 553 5399 0
% Outside Block 4860 1323 0 4696 1256 0
Total 
Sample
SEO Only, 
Issue>0
Issuance, 
Issue>0
1: Officer Block Only 156 6 124
1: Director Non-Officer Block Only 124 2 105
1: Outside Block Only 3727 102 2968
2: Director Non-Officer Block and Outsider Block Only 316 5 254
2: Officer Block and Outsider Block Only 705 18 592
2: Officer Block and Director Non-Officer Block Only 22 0 20
3: All Three Present 112 8 100
None 1021 35 748
Insiders 2420 55 1939
Outsiders 4860 133 3914
Issue > 0 Issue = 0 Issue > 0 Issue = 0
Cash Change (ΔCash) 0.115 0.016 0.023 0.003
Issue 0.209 0.000 0.030 0.000
Debt Proceeds 0.211 0.113 0.119 0.098
Cash Flow 0.094 0.101 0.105 0.080
Other 0.049 0.037 0.039 0.025
Assets 7.531 7.259 7.205 7.476
R&D 58.051 71.293 77.990 35.893
# Block 2.102 2.407 2.425 2.329
# Officer Block 0.216 0.189 0.200 0.148
# Director Non-Officer Block 0.097 0.109 0.114 0.088
# Outside Block 1.659 1.879 1.898 1.810
% Block 20.062 23.929 23.738 24.504
% Officer Block 2.149 2.540 2.589 2.247
% Director Non-Officer Block 1.129 1.279 1.345 0.947
% Outside Block 14.681 16.860 16.910 16.687
SEO Proceeds 261.339 0.000
All Issuance Proceeds 59.890 -0.002
Panel B: Total number of observations in the sample versus number of observations the year of an issuance
Panel C: Break out to compare mean values when Issue is positive
Means:
SEO Issuance Only All Issuance Sample
SEO Issuance Only Sample All Issuance Sample
This table displays summary statistics for the primary variables that are used in this study regarding the blockholder sample. Cash
Change (ΔCash) is the difference between cash at the end of the year and cash at the beginning of the year. Issue is the cash
proceeds from share issuance. Debt is the proceeds from debt sales. Cash flow is cash flow from operations. Other is all other cash
sources, which include the sales of assets and investments. These measures are scaled by total assets measured at the beginning of
the year. Assets is the log of total assets. Blockholders are those who own at least 5% of the firm’s equity in a given year. # Block
is the number of all blockholders for that firm-year. # Officer Block is the number of officer director blockholders. # Non-Officer
Dir Block is the number of non-officer director blockholders. # Outside Block is the number of outside blockholders. % Officer
Block is the percentage held by officer director blockholders. % Non-Officer Dir Block is the percentage held by non-officer
director blockholders. % Outside Block is the percentage held by outside blockholders. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles, with the exception of Issue for the SEO Sample Only. Observations with Issue greater than 10 are dropped
for the SEO Only sample. The SEO Issuance Only Sample consists of only measuring issuance from proceeds of SEOs using the
SDC database. SEO Issuance Only Sample is the sample used in the rest of this paper. The All Issuance Sample, the sample when
all issuances, not just SEOs, are used, is reported here for comparison purposes only and is not used in the rest of the paper. The
sample consists of 6,183 firm-year observations during the period 1996–2001
Table1b
Descriptive Statistics  - Blockholders
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Panel A:
Total Sample Issue>0
Percentage of 
sample where 
Issue >0
20% <= Institutional Ownership 66,640 5,853 8.78%
5% <= Institutional Ownership < 20% 28,775 2,367 8.23%
0% <=Institutional Ownership < 5% 32,413 1,525 4.70%
Total 127,828 9,745 7.62%
Ownership = 0% 10,568 605 5.72%
Panel B: Summary statistics when institutional ownership is greater than zero
Obs Median Mean Std. Dev.
Total Institutional Ownership (%) 117,260 26.0% 32.2% 27%
Issue
Institutional Ownership Ratio > 0 1.050
20% <= Institutional Ownership 0.866
5% <= Institutional Ownership < 20% 1.296
0% <=Institutional Ownership < 5% 1.830
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics - Institutional Ownership 
# of firm years
This table displays summary statistics regarding the institutional ownership sample. Panel A reports the number observations in the sample when
different percentage totals of firm shares are held by institutions in that year for a firm. Panel B reports the median level of institutional ownership
for the sample, given that the level is above zero. Panel C reports the mean SEO issuance size. The variable Issue is the SEO issuance proceeds
this year scaled by total assets from the prior year-end. The sample consists of 127,828 firm-year observations during the period 1980–2008.
Panel C: Mean size of SEO issuance when the issuance is greater than zero. 
The variable Issue is the SEO issuance proceeds this year scaled by total assets from the year before.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash
Issue 0.486*** 0.417*** 0.589*** 0.318** 0.522*** 0.491*** 0.407***
(4.04) (3.51) (5.80) (2.12) (6.46) (3.14) (4.14)
D(Insider Block) -0.0067 -0.00673 -0.00636 -0.00622
(-1.55) (-1.57) (-1.49) (-1.48)
D(Insider Block)*Issue 0.292** 0.323** 0.281** 0.310***
(2.19) (2.28) (2.44) (2.65)
D(Outsider Block) 0.00522* 0.00732** 0.00453 0.00663**
(1.71) (2.43) (1.44) (2.19)
D(Outsider Block)*Issue -0.129 -0.151 -0.0891 -0.109
(-0.54) (-0.69) (-0.36) (-0.51)
Debt Proceeds 0.0604*** 0.0597*** 0.0596*** 0.0617*** 0.0616*** 0.0592*** 0.0610***
(2.86) (2.84) (2.84) (2.91) (2.91) (2.82) (2.88)
Cash flow 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.147***
(6.89) (6.48) (7.41) (7.31) (8.01) (7.14) (7.84)
Other 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.0993*** 0.0981*** 0.104*** 0.0972***
(3.38) (3.45) (3.25) (3.49) (3.29) (3.25) (3.30)
Assets -9.15E-04 -1.31E-03 -5.62E-04 -0.00323** -0.00245** -9.82E-04 -0.00287**
(-1.28) (-1.43) (-0.83) (-2.43) (-2.16) (-1.10) (-2.17)
R&D 2.88e-05** 3.10e-05*** 3.07e-05***
(2.41) (2.75) (2.68)
R&D*Issue 0.0008 0.000739* 0.000820*
(1.63) (1.66) (1.65)
Constant -0.00241 0.00298 -0.00871*** 0.0153*** 0.00164 -0.00276 0.00757
(.) (0.95) (-2.59) (2.60) (0.29) (-0.58) (1.04)
Observations 6,183 6,183 6,183 6,183 6,183 6,183 6,183
R-squared 0.108 0.113 0.109 0.119 0.115 0.113 0.120
This table reports the results from panel regressions that contain both firm- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is ΔCash, which is the difference between cash
at the end of the year and cash at the beginning of the year. Issue is the cash proceeds from share issuance. Debt is the proceeds from debt sales. Cash flow is cash flow
from operations. Other is all other cash sources, which include the sales of assets and investments. These measures are scaled by total assets measured at the beginning of
the year. Assets is the log of total assets. This model is then augmented with interaction terms and a control variable. The interaction terms are the product of Issue and
the monitoring proxies # Insider Block and # Outsider Block. Each monitoring proxy is also included in the regression as a control. D(# Insider Block) is a dummy for
the presence of an insider blockholder for that firm-year. D(# Outsider Block) is a dummy for the presence of outsider blockholders. Standard errors are estimated by
clustering on both firm and year. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of
6,183 firm-year observations during the period 1996–2001. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, with the exception of Issue. Observations
with Issue greater than 10 are dropped. 
Table 3
Effect of presence of insiders versus outsiders on cash savings after share issuance (Using only SEOs) 
59
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash
Issue 0.433*** 0.479*** 0.429***
(3.62) (4.00) (3.69)
D(# Officer Block) 0.00247 0.00254
(0.46) (0.47)
D(# Officer Block)*Issue 0.251* 0.245
(1.72) (1.63)
D(# Director Non-Officer Block) -0.00751** -0.00757**
(-2.31) (-2.30)
D(# Director Non-Officer Block)*Issue 0.2670 0.2100
(1.17) (0.75)
Debt Proceeds 0.0595*** 0.0604*** 0.0596***
(2.85) (2.87) (2.85)
Cash flow 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.143***
(6.54) (6.91) (6.58)
Other 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.107***
(3.42) (3.48) (3.52)
Assets -7.07E-04 -0.00113* -9.18E-04
(-0.78) (-1.74) (-1.06)
Constant -0.00393* -0.0003 -0.0019
(-1.77) (.) (-0.87)
Observations 6,183 6,183 6,183
R-squared 0.111 0.109 0.112
This table reports the results from panel regressions that contain both firm- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is ΔCash, which is the
difference between cash at the end of the year and cash at the beginning of the year. Issue is the cash proceeds from share issuance. Debt is the
proceeds from debt sales. Cash flow is cash flow from operations. Other is all other cash sources, which include the sales of assets and
investments. These measures are scaled by total assets measured at the beginning of the year. Assets is the log of total assets. This model is then
augmented with interaction terms and a control variable. The interaction terms are the product of Issue and the monitoring proxies # Officer Block
and Director Non-Officer Block. Each monitoring proxy is also included in the regression as a control. D(# Officer Block) is a dummy for the
presence of officer director blockholders. D(# Director Non-Officer Block) is a dummy for the presence of non-officer director blockholders.
Standard errors are estimated by clustering on both firm and year. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant
at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of 6,183 firm-year observations during the period 1996–2001. All ratio variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, with the exception of Issue. Observations with Issue greater than 10 are dropped. 
Effect of the presence of blockholders on cash savings after share issuance (Using only SEOs) 
Table 4
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash
Issue 0.404*** 0.393*** 0.337** 0.395*** 0.522*** 0.426***
(2.66) (2.97) (2.24) (2.59) (6.46) (4.73)
D(# Block) 0.00516
(1.51)
D(# Block)*Issue 0.0135
(0.05)
D(# Officer Block) 0.00206 0.0023
(0.38) (0.43)
D(# Officer Block)*Issue 0.281* 0.259**
(1.86) (2.07)
D(# Director Non-Officer Block) -0.00766** -0.00711**
(-2.45) (-2.27)
D(# Director Non-Officer Block)*Issue 0.2960 0.252
(1.44) (0.99)
D(# Outside Block) 0.00732** 0.00700**
(2.43) (2.30)
D(# Outside Block)*Issue -0.151 -0.116
(-0.69) (-0.55)
Debt Proceeds 0.0624*** 0.0621*** 0.0616*** 0.0625*** 0.0616*** 0.0609***
(2.93) (2.86) (2.91) (2.93) (2.91) (2.89)
Cash flow 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.146***
(7.71) (8.16) (7.34) (7.75) (8.01) (7.98)
Other 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 0.0981*** 0.0986***
(3.42) (3.29) (3.45) (3.52) (3.29) (3.35)
Assets -0.00282** -0.00255** -0.00266** -0.00305*** -0.00245** -0.00250**
(-2.46) (-2.07) (-1.99) (-2.89) (-2.16) (-2.06)
R&D 2.89e-05** 3.00e-05*** 2.89e-05** 2.89e-05** 3.10e-05*** 3.09e-05***
(2.47) (2.67) (2.44) (2.46) (2.75) (2.69)
R&D*Issue 0.00 0.000716 0.000789 0.000728 0.000739* 0.000810*
(1.55) (1.60) (1.62) (1.56) (1.66) (1.66)
Constant 0.00968*** 0.0034 0.00857 0.0119*** 0.00164 0.00275
(2.85) (0.43) (1.58) (6.26) (0.29) (0.48)
Observations 6,183 6,183 6,183 6,183 6,183 6,183
R-squared 0.114 0.114 0.117 0.115 0.115 0.119
This table reports the results from panel regressions that contain both firm- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is ΔCash, which is the difference between cash at the end of the year
and cash at the beginning of the year. Issue is the cash proceeds from share issuance. Debt is the proceeds from debt sales. Cash flow is cash flow from operations. Other is all other cash
sources, which include the sales of assets and investments. These measures are scaled by total assets measured at the beginning of the year. Assets is the log of total assets. This model is then
augmented with interaction terms and a control variable. The interaction terms are the product of Issue and the monitoring proxies # Block, # Officer Block, # Director Non-Officer Block, and
# Outside Block. Each monitoring proxy is also included in the regression as a control. D(# Block) is a dummy for the presence of blockholders for that firm-year. D(# Officer Block) is a
dummy for the presence of officer blockholders. D(# Director Non-Officer Block) is a dummy for the presence of non-officer director blockholders. D(# Outside Block) is a dummy for the
presence ofoutside blockholders. Standard errors are estimated by clustering on both firm and year. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** =
significant at 1%. The sample consists of 6,183 firm-year observations during the period 1996–2001. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, with the exception of
Issue. Observations with Issue greater than 10 are dropped. 
After controlling for R&D - Effect of the presence of blockholders on cash savings after share issuance (Using only SEOs) 
Table 5
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash
Issue 0.486*** 0.474** 0.608*** 0.404** 0.480** 0.653*** 0.493**
(4.04) (2.48) (8.53) (2.41) (2.48) (14.55) (2.46)
D(# Block) -0.00201**
(-2.40)
D(# Block)*Issue -0.0605
(-0.59)
D(# Officer Block) -0.00663 -0.0058
(-1.02) (-0.75)
D(# Officer Block)*Issue 0.352** 0.437***
(2.38) (3.25)
D(# Director Non-Officer Block) -0.0041 -0.0030
(-1.10) (-0.53)
D(# Director Non-Officer Block)*Issue -0.474*** -0.783***
(-2.69) (-6.56)
D(# Outside Block) -0.0005 0.0066
(-0.48) (1.43)
D(# Outside Block)*Issue -0.0888 -0.1180
(-0.96) (-0.39)
Debt Proceeds 0.0604*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.113***
(2.86) (4.18) (4.23) (4.24) (4.20) (4.16) (4.93)
Cash flow 0.143*** 0.293*** 0.284*** 0.302*** 0.294*** 0.287*** 0.314***
(6.89) (3.69) (3.89) (3.87) (3.71) (3.87) (4.50)
Other 0.107*** 0.0589*** 0.0528** 0.0565*** 0.0587*** 0.0525** 0.0558**
(3.38) (3.06) (2.22) (3.46) (3.04) (2.25) (2.25)
Assets -9.15E-04 -2.52E-03 -3.00E-03 -2.87E-03 -2.49E-03 -2.65E-03 -2.31E-03
(-1.28) (-1.27) (-1.40) (-1.31) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.14)
Finance Deficit 0.103 0.0876 0.11 0.103 0.0887 0.11
(0.78) (0.77) (0.82) (0.78) (0.79) (1.00)
Age -0.000537*** -0.000556*** -0.000575*** -0.000548*** -0.000538*** -0.000570***
(-10.73) (-12.08) (-10.56) (-11.61) (-12.72) (-9.09)
Finance Deficit x Age -0.00525** -0.00510** -0.00523** -0.00525** -0.00517** -0.00541**
(-2.34) (-2.38) (-2.29) (-2.33) (-2.45) (-2.51)
Net Working Capital -0.0942*** -0.0955*** -0.0914*** -0.0942*** -0.0956*** -0.0899***
(-3.62) (-3.59) (-3.60) (-3.59) (-3.60) (-3.82)
Capital Expenditure -0.213** -0.208*** -0.220** -0.214** -0.208*** -0.245***
(-2.50) (-2.72) (-2.58) (-2.54) (-2.70) (-3.10)
R&D 4.16e-05*** 3.96e-05*** 4.24e-05*** 4.10e-05*** 4.13e-05*** 4.32e-05***
(3.58) (3.76) (3.48) (3.46) (3.90) (3.38)
Acquisitions -0.203*** -0.205*** -0.207*** -0.202*** -0.206*** -0.216***
(-5.10) (-5.02) (-5.09) (-5.05) (-4.89) (-5.26)
Payout -0.375*** -0.382*** -0.379*** -0.374*** -0.379*** -0.387***
(-7.96) (-7.99) (-7.63) (-7.83) (-7.87) (-8.59)
Constant -0.00241 0.0493*** 0.0593*** 0.0538*** 0.0500*** 0.0518*** 0.0465**
(.) (2.85) (2.83) (2.62) (3.02) (2.71) (2.30)
Observations 6,183 3,753 3,753 3,753 3,753 3,753 3,753
R-squared 0.108 0.174 0.177 0.181 0.175 0.179 0.190
This table reports the results from panel regressions that contain both firm- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is ΔCash, which is the difference between cash at the end of the year and cash at the beginning of the year. Issue is the cash
proceeds from share issuance. Debt is the proceeds from debt sales. Cash flow is cash flow from operations. Other is all other cash sources, which include the sales of assets and investments. These measures are scaled by total assets measured at the
beginning of the year. Assets is the log of total assets. This model is then augmented with other independent variables suggested by Dittmar and Duchin (2011). The finance deficit is the flow of funds deficit, defined as cash dividends, plus capital
expenditures, changes in net working capital (less cash) and current portion of long-term debt due, less operating cash flow, where all variables are deflated by assets. Age is the number of years since the firm's IPO. Net Working Capital is net working
capital (wcap ) excluding cash (che ), divided by lagged total assets (at ). t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of 6,183 firm-year observations during the period
1996–2001. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, with the exception of Issue. Observations with Issue greater than 10 are dropped. 
Considering other independent variables from Dittmar and Duchin (2011)
Table 6
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash ΔCash
Issue 0.378*** 0.339*** 0.346*** 0.360*** 0.425*** 0.276*** 0.425*** 0.426*** 0.466***
(48.26) (27.33) (34.88) (36.24) (46.06) (21.82) (41.92) (29.87) (37.87)
Institutional Ownership 0.0163*
(1.96)
Institutional Ownership*Issue 0.205***
(3.98)
D(20% or Greater Institutional Ownership) 0.00744** 0.0142** 0.0103***
(2.39) (2.26) (3.97)
D(20% or Greater Institutional Ownership)*Issue 0.0795*** 0.149*** -0.000702
(4.83) (8.50) (-0.04)
D(5% <= Institutional Ownership < 20%) -0.00436 0.00392 -0.0103***
(-1.25) (0.62) (-3.97)
D(5% <=Institutional Ownership < 20%)*Issue 0.0669*** 0.150*** 0.000702
(3.64) (7.28) (0.04)
D(0% <= Institutional Ownership < 5%) -0.00798 -0.0142** -0.00392
(-1.29) (-2.26) (-0.62)
D(0% <= Institutional Ownership < 5%)*Issue -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.150***
(-8.67) (-8.50) (-7.28)
IO Concentration (Using Herfindahl- Hirschman Index) -0.0512***
(-4.33)
IO Concentration*Issue -0.225***
(-9.82)
Debt Proceeds 0.0612*** 0.0608*** 0.0614*** 0.0615*** 0.0617*** 0.0621*** 0.0621*** 0.0621*** 0.0572***
(5.91) (5.86) (5.94) (6.04) (6.29) (6.32) (6.32) (6.32) (5.72)
Cash flow -0.172*** -0.178*** -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.153***
(-6.98) (-7.24) (-7.14) (-7.08) (-7.33) (-7.33) (-7.33) (-7.33) (-5.17)
Other 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.0927***
(5.15) (4.87) (4.95) (5.15) (4.87) (4.83) (4.83) (4.83) (4.30)
Assets 0.00403** 2.48E-03 2.79E-03 0.00390** 2.67E-03 1.73E-03 1.73E-03 1.73E-03 -1.81E-03
(2.35) (1.37) (1.60) (2.31) (1.51) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (-0.88)
Constant 0.0190*** 0.0247*** 0.0233*** 0.0206*** 0.0305*** 0.0260*** 0.0402*** 0.0299*** 0.0638***
(3.00) (3.76) (3.54) (3.33) (3.12) (4.22) (4.00) (3.04) (4.42)
Observations 127,822 127,822 127,822 127,822 127,822 127,822 127,822 127,822 117,259
R-squared 0.351 0.354 0.354 0.353 0.361 0.361 0.361 0.361 0.385
This table reports the results from panel regressions that contain both firm- and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is ΔCash, which is the difference between cash at the end of the year and cash at the beginning of
the year. Issue is the cash proceeds from share issuance. Debt is the proceeds from debt sales. Cash flow is cash flow from operations. Other is all other cash sources, which include the sales of assets and investments. These
measures are scaled by total assets measured at the beginning of the year. Assets is the log of total assets. This model is then augmented with interaction terms and a control variable. Institutional Ownership is a continuous
variable for the combined percentage ownership by all institutional investors in the firm. The interaction terms are total percentage of ownership held by institutional investors. D(20% or Greater Holdings) is a dummy for
the presence of total institutional of greater than 20% in that year for a firm. D(5% <= Inst. Holdings < 20%) is a dummy for the presence of total institutional between 5% and 20% in that year for a firm. D(0% <= Inst.
Holdings < 5%) is a dummy for the presence of total institutional of less than 5% in that year for a firm. Standard errors are estimated by clustering on both firm and year. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * =
significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of 127,822 firm-year observations during the period 1980–2008. All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, with
the exception of Issue. Observations with Issue greater than 10 are dropped. 
Effect of the presence of Institutional Holdings on cash savings after share issuance (Using only SEOs) 
Table 7
63
Obs Mean
t-test
(p-value) Median
Wilcoxon test
(p-value)
Outside Blockholder 81 -8.02% 0.007*** -0.03% 0.643
Officer Blockholder 26 -25.16% 0.040** -0.94% 0.067*
Difference 17.14% 0.041** 0.91% 0.209
Outside Blockholder 70 9.72% 0.000*** 5.13% 0.698
Officer Blockholder 23 6.29% 0.128 0.96% 0.119
Difference 3.42% 0.435 4.17% 0.185
Outside Blockholder 81 -8.06% 0.000*** -5.78% 0.314
Officer Blockholder 25 -8.63% 0.001*** -4.77% 0.537
Difference 0.57% 0.854 -1.02% 0.809
Outside Blockholder 81 53.74% 0.000*** 31.40% 0.359
Officer Blockholder 26 66.40% 0.004*** 45.01% 0.524
Difference -12.66% 0.558 -13.61% 0.799
This table reports changes in key financial statistics from the year end following the SEO to 4 years after the SEO, comparing both firms with
an outside blockholder to those with an officer blockholder. Cash is scaled by total assets and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Cash
in Year 4 is scaled by total assets in year 4. Excess cash is defined as the difference between actual cash and predicted, normal cash (see
Appendix B). Operating income is operating income before depreciation (Compustat item oibdp ). If a firm has more than one SEO, they will
be in this sample twice. Blockholders are those who own at least 5% of the firm’s equity in a given year. Outside Blockholder is a dummy for
the presence of outsider blockholders for that firm-year. Officer Blockholder is a dummy for the presence of officer blockholders for that firm-
year.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Change in Cash over 4 years from time of SEO
Panel C: Change in Operating Income over 4 years from time of SEO
Panel D: Change in Total Assets over 4 years from time of SEO
Table 8
Changes after the SEO - Blockholder Dataset (Using only SEOs)
Panel B: Estimated excess Cash 4 years from time of SEO
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Obs Mean
t-test
(p-value) Median
Wilcoxon test
(p-value)
Institutional Holdings=0% 349 -67.19% 0.000*** -27.74% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings>0% 6479 -47.14% 0.000*** -10.24% 0.000***
Difference -20.04% 0.000*** -17.50% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings<5% 960 -60.77% 0.000*** -23.36% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings>5% 5868 -46.11% 0.000*** -9.47% 0.000***
Difference -48.17% 0.000*** -13.90% 0.000***
5%<Institutional Holdings<20% 1641 -57.09% 0.000*** -16.65% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings>20% 4227 -41.84% 0.000*** -7.35% 0.000***
Difference -15.25% 0.000*** -9.30% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings=0% 53 -14.48% 0.000*** -20.67% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings>0% 4110 7.66% 0.000*** -3.11% 0.000***
Difference -22.14% 0.000*** -17.57% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings<5% 226 -6.96% 0.003*** -16.45% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings>5% 3937 8.20% 0.000*** -2.58% 0.000***
Difference -15.16% 0.000*** -13.87% 0.000***
5%<Institutional Holdings<20% 933 4.98% 0.002*** -6.37% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings>20% 3004 9.20% 0.000*** -1.52% 0.000***
Difference -4.22% 0.002*** -4.85% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings=0% 347 9.15% 0.009*** -4.43% 0.023**
Institutional Holdings>0% 6453 -1.97% 0.000*** -5.41% 0.023**
Difference 11.12% 0.000*** 0.98% 0.023**
Institutional Holdings<5% 955 6.31% 0.003*** -4.67% 0.017**
Institutional Holdings>5% 5845 -2.66% 0.000*** -5.48% 0.017**
Difference 8.97% 0.000*** 0.81% 0.017**
5%<Institutional Holdings<20% 1628 -1.29% 0.345 -8.07% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings>20% 4217 -3.19% 0.000*** -4.73% 0.010***
Difference 1.90% 0.122 -3.34% 0.000***
Institutional Holdings=0% 350 183.29% 0.000*** 56.12% 0.172
Institutional Holdings>0% 6496 138.45% 0.000*** 59.55% 0.172
Difference 44.84% 0.040** -3.43% 0.172
Institutional Holdings<5% 963 187.32% 0.000*** 57.71% 0.1807
Institutional Holdings>5% 5883 133.11% 0.000*** 59.74% 0.1807
Difference 140.74% 0.000*** -2.03% 0.1807
5%<Institutional Holdings<20% 1645 155.26% 0.000*** 60.47% 0.843
Institutional Holdings>20% 4238 124.52% 0.000*** 59.61% 0.433
Difference 30.75% 0.010*** 0.86% 0.923
Panel D: Change in Total Assets over 4 years from time of SEO
This table reports changes in key financial statistics from the year end following the SEO to 4 years after the SEO, comparing firms with different total levels of institutional
ownership. Cash is scaled by total assets and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Cash in Year 4 is scaled by total assets in year 4. Excess cash is defined as the difference
between actual cash and predicted, normal cash (see Appendix B). Operating income is operating income before depreciation (Compustat item oibdp). If a firm has more than one
SEO, they will be in this sample twice. Institutional Holdings>20% is a dummy for the presence of total institutional of greater than 20% in that year for a firm. 5%<Institutional
Holdings<20% is a dummy for the presence of total institutional between 5% and 20% in that year for a firm. Institutional Holdings<5% is a dummy for the presence of total
institutional of less than 5% in that year for a firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 9
Changes after the SEO - Institutional Investor Holdings Dataset (Using only SEOs)
Panel A: Change in Cash over 4 years from time of SEO
Panel B: Estimated excess Cash 4 years from time of SEO
Panel C: Change in Operating Income over 4 years from time of SEO
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Obs
When Excess 
Cash>0 Obs
When Excess 
Cash<=0 Difference
t-test 
(p-value)
When D(Outside Blockholder)>0
Mean Return 94 -2.31 77 -3.02 0.71 0.355
Median Return 94 -2.26 77 -2.54 0.29
When D(Officer Blockholder)>0 
Mean Return 16 -5.27 16 -0.43 -4.84 0.006**
Median Return 16 -5.46 16 -1.11 -4.35
Obs
When Excess 
Cash>0 Obs
When Excess 
Cash<=0 Difference
t-test 
(p-value)
When D(Outside Blockholder)>0
Mean Return 101 -2.54 70 -2.76 0.22 0.773
Median Return 101 -2.38 70 -2.08 -0.29
When D(Officer Blockholder)>0 
Mean Return 19 -3.51 13 -1.90 -1.61 0.397
Median Return 19 -3.53 13 -1.48 -2.05
Table 10
Summary Statistics of Blockholdings, Excess Cash, and SEO Announcement Returns
This table reports summary statistics relating announcement period returns to firm excess cash prior to and at the time of seasoned equity offerings.
Returns are the cumulative abnormal returns measured as the Fama-French adjusted returns over the interval (-3,3) around the equity announcement
date. Returns are reported as percentages. If the firm has more than one SEO in the same fiscal year, I drop all SEO's after the first. D(Outside
Blockholder) is a dummy for the presence of outside blockholders in the year-end immediately prior to the equity issue announcement date. D(#
Officer Block) is a dummy for the presence of director-officer blockholders in the year-end immediately prior to the equity issue announcement
date. Excess Cash is the difference between actual cash and predicted, normal cash, as described in Appendix B. Panel A reports announcement
returns when comparing year-end levels of excess cash from the year before the SEO. Panel B reports announcement returns when comparing year-
end levels of excess cash from the year the SEO occured. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
Panel A: Return Event Window (-3,3) When Measuring Excess Cash From the Year End Before SEO
Panel B: Return Event Window (-3,3) When Measuring Excess Cash From the Year End of SEO
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return
Number of Officer Director Blocks 0.321 0.431 0.225 -0.901 -0.946
(0.27) (0.36) (0.19) (-0.48) (-0.50)
Number of Outsider Blocks -0.978 -1.0160 -1.1120 -1.4330 -1.5010
(-0.80) (-0.84) (-0.88) (-0.71) (-0.73)
Excess Cash (year before SEO) -6.742 -6.797 -11.22 -10.34
(-1.60) (-1.60) (-1.47) (-1.36)
Excess Cash (year of SEO) 3.827 3.776 6.426 5.804
(1.05) (1.02) (1.04) (0.94)
Firm Size 0.728* 0.749* 0.705* 0.901** 0.940** -0.163 -0.249
(1.77) (1.82) (1.76) (2.19) (2.25) (-0.21) (-0.33)
Age 2.346 2.6020 2.31 1.105 1.251 7.228 8.151
(0.68) (0.75) (0.67) (0.31) (0.35) (1.09) (1.15)
Leverage -5.282* -5.676** -5.262* -5.118* -5.664** -4.345 -4.205
(-1.89) (-2.07) (-1.89) (-1.76) (-1.99) (-0.83) (-0.78)
E Index 0.489
(0.76)
G Index 0.125
(0.38)
Constant -6.317** -7.283*** -6.073** -7.026** -8.205*** -1.532 -1.107
(-2.23) (-2.85) (-2.28) (-2.55) (-3.16) (-0.28) (-0.19)
Observations 157 157 157 152 152 58 58
R-squared 0.068 0.064 0.067 0.085 0.080 0.170 0.162
Table 11
Effect of Blockholdings and Excess Cash on SEO Announcement Returns
This table reports the results from regressions relating announcement period returns to blockholder ownership prior to and at the time of seasoned equity offerings. The dependent
variable in the regressions is the cumulative abnormal returns measured as the Fama-French adjusted returns over the interval (-3,3) around the equity announcement date. If the firm
has more than one SEO in the same fiscal year, I drop all SEO's after the first. Excess Cash is the difference between actual cash and predicted, normal cash, as described in
Appendix B. Excess Cash (year before SEO) is the excess cash at the year-end prior to the equity issue announcement date. Excess Cash (year of SEO) is the excess cash at the year-
end of the year that contained the equity issue announcement date. Firm size is the book-value of total assets in the year-end prior to the equity issue announcement date. Age is the
firm age scaled by 100. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, measured in the year-end prior to the equity issue announcement date. The G-Index is the Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick governance index. The E-Index is the Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell entrenchment index. Standard errors are estimated by clustering on both firm and year. t-Statistics are
reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of 157 firm-year observations during the period 1996–2001. 
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Obs
When Excess 
Cash>0 Obs
When Excess 
Cash<=0 Difference
t-test 
(p-value)
When D(0% <= Inst. Holdings < 5%)>0 
Mean Return 189 -1.86 48 -3.12 1.25 0.550
Median Return 189 -1.08 48 -4.82 3.74
When D(5% <= Inst. Holdings < 20%)>0
Mean Return 423 -3.45 200 -4.20 0.75 0.467
Median Return 423 -2.88 200 -3.97 1.09
When D(Inst. Holdings >= 20%)>0
Mean Return 2426 -3.58 1985 -3.94 0.36 0.198
Median Return 2426 -3.03 1985 -3.73 0.69
Obs
When Excess 
Cash>0 Obs
When Excess 
Cash<=0 Difference
t-test 
(p-value)
When D(0% <= Inst. Holdings < 5%)>0 
Mean Return 172 -1.69 65 -3.25 1.56 0.41
Median Return 172 -1.02 65 -4.56 3.54
When D(5% <= Inst. Holdings < 20%)>0
Mean Return 416 -3.54 207 -4.00 0.46 0.65
Median Return 416 -2.84 207 -3.60 0.76
When D(Inst. Holdings >= 20%)>0
Mean Return 2697 -3.63 1714 -3.91 0.28 0.32
Median Return 2697 -3.14 1714 -3.72 0.58
This table reports summary statistics relating announcement period returns to firm excess cash prior to and at the time of seasoned equity offerings. Returns
are the cumulative abnormal returns measured as the Fama-French adjusted returns over the interval (-3,3) around the equity announcement date. Returns
are reported as percentages. If the firm has more than one SEO in the same fiscal year, I drop all SEO's after the first. Inst. Holdings is the ratio of the
number of shares held by institutional investors to the number of shares outstanding in the year-end immediately prior to the equity issue announcement
date. Excess Cash is the difference between actual cash and predicted, normal cash, as described in Appendix B. Panel A reports announcement returns
when comparing year-end levels of excess cash from the year before the SEO. Panel B reports announcement returns when comparing year-end levels of
excess cash from the year the SEO occured. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
Panel B: Return Event Window (-3,3) When Measuring Excess Cash From the Year End of SEO
Panel A: Return Event Window (-3,3) When Measuring Excess Cash From the Year End Before SEO
Summary Statistics of Institutional Holdings, Excess Cash, and SEO Announcement Returns
Table 12
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return FF Adj. Return
Institutional Ownership 1.048* 1.509** 1.691** 1.518** 4.660*** 4.709*** 3.859* 3.924**
(1.65) (1.99) (2.24) (2.03) (3.00) (3.03) (1.95) (1.98)
Excess Cash (year before SEO) -1.170* 0.1260 2.7430 2.7270
(-1.93) (0.29) (1.25) (1.24)
Excess Cash (year of SEO) 1.805*** 0.763* -1.494 -1.457
(3.10) (1.90) (-0.68) (-0.67)
Firm Size 0.0576 0.265* 0.169 0.118 -0.0157 -0.0764 -0.107 -0.141
(0.54) (1.83) (1.20) (0.89) (-0.06) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.41)
Age 1.761 0.845 0.997 1.428 3.989 5.418** 5.761* 7.204**
(1.37) (0.51) (0.60) (0.89) (1.63) (2.11) (1.81) (2.13)
Leverage -0.156 -0.475 -0.705 -0.0725 1.583 1.778 3.067 3.282
(-0.22) (-0.54) (-0.81) (-0.09) (0.84) (0.94) (1.42) (1.52)
Issue fraction 0.0574 0.1580 0.148 0.109 1.076*** 1.082*** 1.090*** 1.097***
(1.08) (1.42) (1.33) (1.01) (3.68) (3.69) (3.45) (3.47)
E Index 0.0925 0.0293
(0.36) (0.09)
G Index -0.11 -0.127
(-0.85) (-0.80)
Constant -2.529*** -3.926*** -3.290*** -3.196*** -5.181** -3.975* -4.606* -3.594
(-6.19) (-6.47) (-5.75) (-6.00) (-2.56) (-1.84) (-1.81) (-1.34)
Observations 5,042 3,695 3,695 3,933 476 474 356 355
R-squared 0.013 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.074 0.075 0.086 0.088
This table reports the results from regressions relating announcement period returns to institutional ownership prior to and at the time of seasoned equity offerings. The dependent variable in the
regressions is the cumulative abnormal returns measured as the Fama-French adjusted returns over the interval (-3,3) around the equity announcement date. If the firm has more than one SEO in
the same fiscal year, I drop all SEO's after the first. Institutional Ownership is the ratio of the number of shares held by institutional investors to the number of shares outstanding in the year-end
immediately prior to the equity issue announcement date. Excess Cash is the difference between actual cash and predicted, normal cash, as described in Appendix B. Excess Cash (year before
SEO) is the excess cash at the year-end prior to the equity issue announcement date. Excess Cash (year of SEO) is the excess cash at the year-end of the year that contained the equity issue
announcement date. Firm size is the book-value of total assets in the year-end prior to the equity issue announcement date. Age is the firm age scaled by 100. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to
total assets, measured in the year-end prior to the equity issue announcement date. Issue fraction is the ratio of the number of new shares issued to the total number of shares outstanding prior to
the equity issue. The G-Index is the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index. The E-Index is the Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell entrenchment index. Standard errors are estimated by
clustering on both firm and year. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of 5,042 firm-year
observations during the period 1980–2008. 
Table 13
Effect of Institutional Holdings and Excess Cash on SEO Announcement Returns
Governance Index Controls
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